Planning with imperfect information : interceptor assignment by McAllister, Daniel B. (Daniel Brandford)
Planning with Imperfect Information: Interceptor Assignment
by
Daniel B. McAllister
B.S., Operations Research and Mathematical Sciences
United States Air Force Academy, 2004
Submitted to the Sloan School of Management
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science in Operations Research
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY'
June 2006
( Daniel B. McAllister, MMVI. All rights reserved.
The author hereby grants to MIT permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper
and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
. ~ , ,.. / .1 ..
Author ........................................................... --.
Sloan School of Management
Interdepartmental Program in Operations Research
May 18, 2006
Approved by .................................................
Certified by....
Certified by.
Edmund K.
' Alexander Kahn
Member of the Technical Staff, The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc.
_/ Technice SulpervisQr
Leslie P. Kaelbling
Professor, Computer Science and Engineering
Research Director, MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Thesis Advisor
k K .Patrick Jaillet
Turner Professor and Head, Civil and Environmental Engineering
,,, ThesiSuRNor
Accepted by .....................................................
I T ma R nrlir
SSACHUSETTS INSjTE
OFTECHNOLOGY I
JUL 2 4 2006
LIBRARIES
coa Edward Pennell Brooks Professor of Operations Research
I W. Co-Director, Operations Research Center
MA'
r
2
Planning with Iperfect Information: Interceptor Assignment
l)V
Dalliel B. IMcAllister
Sulllitte(d to tle Sloan School of Maiiagelllent
on May 18. 2006. i )partial fulfillinent of the
re(lqtireielitts for te (legree of
Iaster of S(cienllce ill Op)erationls Research
Abstract
\e ('consider' the [)roblel of assigning a sarce lulnnl)er of intercei)tors to a wave of il(coining
(atlllosl)hlli( re-enlltry vehicles (RV). Ill this single wave. there is timle to assigin itercel)tors
t') a wave of i('colling RVs, gain information o the iltercel)t status. a(l then if ne(essarv.
assign illter'eI)tors once more. However. te status illforllltionl of these RVs mlay lnot e
reliaile. This I)lo)leil l)e('olnes challenging when collsidering the small ivelltory of illter-
cel)tors. implerfect iforimation froIl sensors, ald the p)ossiility of flture waves of RVs.
Thllis work formulllllates the I)robllel as a Ipartially oserval)le \Ilarkov d(ecision Iprocess
(PO()IIDP) ill order to accouit for the ulll(ertailt ill ilfforatioli. We use a POMIDP solu-
tioll algorithllll to finlld a otillmal Ipolicy for assigiling interceItors to RVs ill a silgle wave.
Fromll there. three ases are collll)ared ill a simulationl of a single wave. These cases are
pIcrfect illforlllation)ll frolll sellsors: imlI)erfe('t iformaltioll frolll senllsors. but actillg as it were
pcrfe(t: ad ac(()untinlg for ilI)erfect iforniatioll froli senisors using the P()OIDP forlm-
latioll. Usiilg a variety of I)aralueter variation tests. we examine the I)erformllan(e of the
PF'OMDP formulationr by comIii)arinlg the Iprobal)ility of al incolillg RV' avoililng itercel)t
al(d the itercel)tor iventory remaining. We vary the reliability of thle senlsors. as well as
tlle ntilib)er of itercel)tors iii ivelitory. amd the iimber of iterceito Rs i n. n e le f i s i the wave. The
P'()5IDP fornlllationl consistently I)rovides a )oli(cy that collserves miore illterel)tors aicd I)ap-
proacllhes the I)ro)ablility of interceP)t of tle other cases. However. situatiolls dlo exist where
tile PONIDP formulation I)ro(hlces a I)olicy that Iperforllls less effectively thaln a strategy
as-llillng l)erfect informalltion.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Description
For deca(les. tile United States has been vulnerable to ballistic missile attacks that could
devastate the nation with nuclear, biological. or chemical weapons. In today's world. these
a.ttacks could co:rne from not only a. traditional foe such a.s North Korea or Iran. but also
all accilental or unauthorized launch or, more likely, a stateless terrorist organization [15].
.Malnv of these enelmies view weapons of mass destruction as an asymmetric means to counter
tlhe conventional military might of the United States.
In recent. years, ballistic missile technology has spread to more and more countries. Na-
tions all over the world are dleveloping missiles capable of reaching the United States [1]. On
August 31. 1998.. North Korea successfully launched the three-stage Ta.epo Dong 1 missile
over ,Japan that a-llnlost reached Hawaii [5]. While it is not known whether this was a failed
spa.ce launch or an intercontinental ballistic nlissile test, this initially undetected three-stage
missile proved that North Korea had the capability to hit any point on earth with a several-
hundred pound vwarhlead [5]. Presently it is known that North Korea's Ta.epo Dong 2 missile
could reach Alaska and Hawaii with a nuclear payload in a. two-stage rocket configuration.
If a third stage were added. this missile would likely be able to reach all of North America.
[1.5]. In addition to North Korea.. China and Iran are also reported to be developing and
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testing offensive ballistic missiles. These growing threats have led the U.S. to upgrade its
current deterrenc(e posture with a. ballistic lnissile defense system. The goal of this system
is to render missile attacks on tle U.S. ineffective.
In 2004 the United States stoodl UI) its first defense against lonlg-range missile attacks [15].
For the first time. the U.S. possesses the capability to intercel)t and destroy an in(oming
ballistic lnissile before it strikes its target [1]. While President Reagan envisioned a robust
defense system capable of rendllering mlissile attacks clomlpletely futile, the initial system is
simpler and smaller. This Ground-based Mlidcourse Defense (G.MD) system includes 10 silo-
based interceptor missiles in celltral Alaska and southern California, which will be connected
b)y an extensive command ad control network to a mnix of space- and land-based sensors [1].
Fort Greely, Alaska.. currently has eight operational ground-based interceptor missiles and
Vandenberg Air Force Base. California, has control of two more interceI)tors [3].
This ballistic missile defense system is designed to be te last line of defense if diplomacy
and threats of retaliation fail. Employment. of the grollncd-based interceptor missile is cued on
satellite and radar data and then it uses its own sensors to identify targets launched from any
site [5]. The interceptor correlates its observations with the information from the satellites
a-id radar, and discriminates between decoys and actual warheads [5]. Interceptor missiles
include a. three-stage booster and are tipped with an Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV)
[15]. After the interceptor is approximately 140 miles in space. the kill vehicle detaches from
the mIissile, locates a inconming missile, and destroys it with its sheer kinetic force.
As important as the interceptor missiles themselves is the sensor network used to detect
an incoming attack. This network includes the Air Force's Defense Support Program (DSP)
infrared early warning satellites. an upgraded early warning radar at Beale Air Force Base,
California., a.n upgraded Cobra Dane surveillance radar on Sheinya Island at the western
end of the Aleutian islands. and three forward-deployed Navy Aegis destroyers equipped
with Spy-1 radars [1]. These Aegis ships provide early target-track data [1]. All of these
sensors and missile launch sites are onnected to the heart of the system,. the Command and
Control, Battle Management and Comnmnications network. based a.t Schriever Air Force
18
Bis'. (1ola01 (io.
rlhe (conllalll all d ctrll ol al)e(t of this systeml ultimately relies o Ihuian o)eratons
to make (de(ision1 aout how to defendll(l agalist anl i(comlling attack. I 2002. LUnlited( States
N'ortllerll Collinm-i(lld (USNORTHC()I) was created( andl givenl the responsllil)ilit to efellnd
t-hle U.S. against ml! attack illnclclillg a llg-range missile attack [5]. In turll tlle (olllllll(ier
of USN()RTHC()\I holds that responsibility and wouldl likely lhave the allthorit- to make a
ldecision as to how 1)est to use the inter(el)tor missiles to defelld America galillst an attac('k.
Thllis ommanderl will rel on( United States Strategic Commlland (USSTRATCOSI) to provide
el- wNarllillg frmlll tile Ilreviollsly described sensors and radlars [5].
Tllhe followill,: is a demnlonstration of how all collll)onents work together i all actual
engagement [1]:
1. DSP satellites initially detect a threat lnissile's plum e soon after it is launl(hed.
2. This alerts the fire-control network which )egins plainilg all intercept. Sinmlultaneously.
the other sensors such as Cobra Dane in Alaska. radars at Beal{e AFB, Califorllia. ald
SIpy-1 ra(dars on Aegis shiI)s l)eginl tracking the illonling miissiles.
3. As operators receive higher quality data oi the ill(omlllillg attack. tlley launch their
ilnterceptol missiles.
4. As each EKV detacllhes fromn the nissile and is deplloved into sl)ace. radar c()ntinues to
up)dalte it withl track data.
5. Using these ul)(lates and its own sensors. the EKV locates the warhead of the inlcoing
miissile and collid(es with it.
6. Radar tllen assesses whether or not thle incomillg warhLead was d(estroved to determine
if other intercelptor missiles should be fired.
There are tlhree l)hases of flight for an illcollling ballistic miissile: boost. imidcourse, and
termlilnal. The first phase, boost, usually lasts three to five ilmutes ill which the missile is
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powered by its engines [2]. During tile mlidcourse ph)ase. te missile travels above the at-
inos)llere and releases its warheads becomling llltiI)le objects [2]. Whlen the warhead flls
back into the atlnosphllere it ellters the terminal p.llase [2]. Of these three stages. intercep-
tors target and destroy incoming missiles in the mlidcourse phase-the longest duration of
the three. During the 20 inulrte mlidcourse Iphase a single engagement is assumed to be a
"shoot-look-shoot" scenario. ill which there are two opIportunities to shoot interceptors at a
wave of incoiling missiles. lWe define a shot as a one-timle assignment of multiple interceI)-
tors to multiple ta.rgets. The initial information regarding the nmunber of incoming mlissiles
is a.ssulned to be completely accurate, and the decision maker has all oIpportunity to fire
multiple interceptor missiles at this set of incoming missiles. Next. the decision maker has
anl opportunity to gain inforllation oil which incoming missiles were destroyed and which
incoming missiles remain intact. Lastly. a fina.l decision is made as to how mlany illtercep-
tors to fire at the believed remailning incomling missiles. We assume only enough time for
two shots at a wave of incoming missiles. hence the terml "shoot-look-shoot." The decision
maker must weigh two important issues: saving some interceptor missiles for future waves of
attacks. and stopping all incoming missiles from striking a target. This beconmes a resource
alloca.tion probleln under uncertainty with nmultiple objectives.
While this system aims to provide a very robust network of sensors to detect and track
an incoming attack, there are several known limitations. The Cobra. Dane radar's field of
view ca.n only detect a portion of North Korean missile la.unches [15]. The Beale AFB radar
system has not completed all of its operational testing [15]. Overall. the entire system needs
more extensive testing before America is assured to be safe from a ballistic lnissile attack.
The future holds a great deal of expansion for the ballistic missile defense system. As
stated in the Missile Defense Agency's ba.llistic missile defense systeln overview, "'The mission
of the Missile Defense Agency is to develop all integrated. layered Ballistic MNissile Defense
System (BMIDS) to defend the United States. its deployed forces. allies, and friends from
ballistic missiles of all ranges and in all phases of flight" [1]. This means that in the future
the defense system will include more than just the 10 ground-based interceptor missiles
20
(lisinlle to destroy missiles in the llidcollrse hase of flight. Eventually the BIDS will
includ(e Patriot Advanced Cal)abilit'-3 missiles and Aegis Ballistic Mlissile Defense Standard
MIissile-3 missiles locate( oil forward (leIloyed slliI)s used to destroy short- and mlle(dilll-range
ballisctic missiles. The B-MIDS will have grollnd-l)ased interc(ep)tors for illtermle(liate-range and
interc(ontinental i)allistic missiles. AIn Airborne Laser will 1)e added to the BIDS. employing
a hligh-pI)(wered laser attachedl to an Air Force air('raft (esigned t() (estroy a nlissile ill its
boost p1hase. Lastly. the BMIDS will have a termninal high altitude area defense element
d(esigned to destroy inc(oming nlissiles in their termlilnal phlase [1]. In a.d(lition to adding mIore
mettl()ods to shoot (lown incoll('ing missiles. there will )be improvemlents to urrent sensors andl
addled sensors ill other plarts of the world to augment the current surveillanc.lle and d-etection
component of thlle BMIDS.
While all of these filture components will likely prove to be inmportant in the layered.
integratedl defense of the United States. this thesis will focus only o the GIMD. as it is the
newest. and presently the only operational defenlse against a long-range missile attack.
1.2 Motivation
Because the single engagement problem is a "shoot-look-shoot" situation. there is infor-
Ilation to 1)be gained ill between the first and second decisions. However. in order for this
' shoot-look-shoot' technique to be successful, it requires accurate kill assessment after the
first shot opportulity [17]. To te best of our knowledge, this is the first work that addresses
inl:Lperfect kill assessment in this domnaiIn. Previous work has assumed that after the first shot,
it is known with certaintv whether each target hlas survived or not. This a.ssuIIpItion. how-
ever mlay not actually be valid. One of the main objectives of this thesis is to compare
thlle perforlnance of a system mnaking this assumption and a systenm that tries to accomt for
implLerfct kill assessnment. The focus of this thesis Nwill be managing the uncertainty in kill
assessment.
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1.3 Overview of Thesis
This thesis describes the single engagemntelt problenl assuling ip)erfect. kill assessmlent. Ve
provide all overview of related research and p)revious aI)l)roachles to this pIlobleill. We then
introdluce a partially observable MIarkov decision process (POTMDP) formulation and assess
the performallce of this formulation colipared to other mlethods of solving the problell. We
measure the value of our formulation through a series of experimlents and statistical analysis.
The individual chapters are summalllrized as follows:
Chapter 2: Related Research
In this chllapter we discuss the relate(d research appIlicable to the single engagement. prob-
lemI. We begin with a. discussion of dynamic progralmmllinig and( its characteristics, as well a.s
guidelines for solving a. dynamic programmlllling probleill. We continue with a. description of
.Markov decision processes (IDP) a.s a. class of problenms typically solved by dynamic pro-
grainmling. We outline the comll)onents and decision cycle of ailn IDP. Next. we describe a
variant of the \IDP: the partially observable MIlarkov decision process (POMIDP). VWe discuss
the differences between the MIDP and POM\DP and how they a.re handled. This chapter con-
cludes with a. discussion of the weapoll-target assigmilnteit (WTA) problem as an approa.ch
to the single engagement probleml. We explain how this approach fails to account for the
imperfect information that is assumed by this thesis.
Chapter 3: Problem Formulation
This chap)ter outlines three cases of the single engagement problem that we will use to
assess the impact of imperfect kill assessment: perfect informnation, imI)erfect information
assumed perfect, and imperfect information taken into account. Case 1 acts as a best-case,
and is the case assunmed by previous aI)proaches to this probleiml. Ca-se 2 uses the sanme
strategy as the first: case. except. that. the assumptions of perfect information no longer ex-
ist. Case 3 accounts for this imperfect inforimation and makes decisions based on this nlew
assumption. We focus on the third case and formulate it. as a. POMXIDP.
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Chapter 4: Implementation
We )egill this ('hal)ter with a description of the solution process for POIDPs. We start
with a descri)tiotl of tile POIDP solver software andl tile solution algoritllnls it uses. Next
we liscuss how we simulate tile single engagemlent using either the POIDP solver for Case
3 or the lllaxilllllll Imarginal return (MNIR) algorithm for Case 2 to generate a I)olicy so-
lution. This c'llaI)ter continues with a descrip)tion of the exI)erilental design. \We divide
our exl)eriLleints into three sets: initial exl)eriments. a central co(lil)osite design exp)eriment.
and a set of single-factor exp)erinents. All experiments blegin with a baseline setting for
all factors and chlange factors from this sceenario. First. we conduct initial experiments to
exalmine the effect of three factors on the performance of the PONIDP solver and NIMIR
algorithllm. These factors are left constant in the remaining exl)erinlents. Next. we use a
lentral (conI)osite, design (CCD) exl)eriment testing the effects of five different factors oil
the d(ifference in I)erformlance between the two cases ith impll)erfect illformation. Lastly. we
runll a series of single-factor experinments that vary the same five factors in(lividually. This
provides a more detailed understanding of each fa(t.or's effect on the I)erfornlance of each case.
Chapter 5: Results and Analysis
This chaI)ter l)resents the results and analysis of the experiments described in Chapter
4. We begin with outcomes of the baseline scenario and the results from three initial exper-
ilnients. We continue with statistical analysis on three quadratic models created from the
CCI) in ExI)eriient 4. Lastly. we assess the imlIact of the factors in the final four one-factor
ex)erinlents.
Chapter 6: Summary and Future Work
This clhal)ter summarizes the single engagement I)robleli and the POIMDP formulation.
along with exl)erimental results and conclusions. It ends with a disculssion of suggested
filture work for this problem.
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1.4 Chapter Summary
The U.S. has begun to stand up its Groun(l-ba)sed Mlid(lcourse Defense-the first defense system
designed to defend against long-range ballistic missile attacks. This SVStem's 1() interceptor
missiles are designed to locate and destroy incoming missiles ill space based on information
froln a complex senlsor network of satellites and radar. Due to the very lilmited number of
intercep)tor missiles in inventory. each interceptor is a. high-valued asset. 'While still being
tested and upgraded. there is a great deal of uncertainty in this system. It is not known how
effective the interceptors will be at destroying icoming missiles. and there may be problems
detecting and tracking incoming missiles accurately with the current sensor network. The
problem of assiglling illterceptors to incoming mnissiles in an attack becomes nuch more
challenlging due to the uncertainty in information froml the sensor network. With only two
shots at an incoming missile, it is very imnporta.nt to have accurate kill assessment: that
is. to know which incoming missiles haxve been destroyed and which ones are still headed
inbound. Finding a way to decide how many interceptors to use ill an attack that accounts
for this imperfect kill assessmnent could be very valuable. This task will be the focus of this
thesis. WNXe accomplish this by assessing the impact of a PONIDP formulation that accounts
for imperfect information, and comparing it to existing a)proaches that do not account for
this uncertainty.
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Chapter 2
Related Research
I:L1 this (llcI)pter lwe discuss the researlcl related to this probleml ill order to formulllllate it
llathellaticallv i11( Ilultilllatelv solve it. NWe begin withll (isculssioln of (dvlllllic I)ogralllllling
land Markov decision I)rocesses. Then we discuss the pIartially observal)le iMarkov d(ecisioll
iL'oc(ss. lwhich will be used ill our formulation. Finally. we discuss plrevious formulations of
re.ate(d lproblellls andl their apI)licability to other dolllains.
2.1 Dynamic Programming
The single engle gement pIroblelll described( ill Chapter 1 is a sequential decision problemll. Ollne
of the riilary tchlilllues use(l to solve a problem that optimizes an objective over several
dlecisions is dnalnic Iprogrammling. Although dynallic l)rogrammlllillg problemlls o not have
a specific forlllllltion. they (all be easily recogllized( by several charac(teristics [9]:
1. The p)roblell call be partitioned into stages. At each stage a policy d(ecisioll or action
must )e llladle.
2. Each stage has a numb)er of states associated with that stage. which are the I)ossible
conditions that the system could be in at that stage. There mnay be a finite or infinite
nlluni)er of states.
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3. The policy decision made in each stage will transforlm the current state into a state
associated with the next stage.
4. A recursion call be created on the optimal cost/reward from the origin state to the
destination state.
5. To solve the problem. an optimal policy over the entire problem must be found. This
policy provides the optimnlal decision at each stage for each possible state.
6. An optinlal policy for a fiture stage is only dependent on the current state and not
the decisions made in previous stages. This prop)erty is the Iarkovian property and is
the principle of optimality for dynamic programing.
7. The solution procedure begins by finding the optimal policy for the final stage.
8. There is a recursive relationship that provides the optimal policy for stage n given the
optimal policy for stage n + 1.
9. The solution procedure uses the recursive relationshiIp to start at the last stage and
move backward iteratively finding the optimal policy at each stage. This is carried out
until the optimal policy at the first stage is found.
In dynamic programming the time indices are called epochs. The O-epoch begins at the
end of the planning horizon at the final stage and the epochs increase until the first stage is
reached. In other words an epoch is the number of stages left in which actions can be taken.
According to Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis, the following are guidelines for solving a dynamic
programming problem [4]:
1. View the choice of a feasible solution as a sequence of decisions occurring in stages,
and the tot.a.l cost or reward as the suni of the costs of each decision.
2. Define the state as a summary of all relevant past decisions.
3. Let the cost/reward of the possible state transitions be the cost/reward of the corre-
sponding decision.
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2.2 Markov Decision Process
C)c1( variant of 1;he typical (ynallic )rorallnllillg )pro()lem ill which state transitions are
l( --(ttelllilliS sti ' is a Mlarkov de(cision I)ro(cess (IDP). All IDP is tile secificrtion of a
Seullltitial (tecisioll Il'ol)l('lll for a flly o)serva)lc envirinellllt with a Markvian tralllnsition
mo(del and( a(l(ditive rewards [14]. Aln NIDP is (tefinlte (l) four l)rilmary comp(lI)onents:
1. A set of staltes: s C S
2. A set of actions for each state: (l C A
:3. A transition lllo(lel: T(s. . s')
4. A reward fn(tion for both intermellleiate an(l terminal rewards for each state: R(s. u. s')
Thl( transition model specifies the probability of transitioning froil one state. s. to an-
other state. s'. in one tillle step givell all action. . Inll an IDP there canlll be rewards for
tralnsitioning fon one state to another in intermne(liate time steps as well as a terminal rewNard
fo:r being ill a state at the final stage. Alln DP mlay transition an infinite numl)er of timles
(infinite horizon) or it may' only transition a finite numlber of times (finite horizon). The goal
,f an IDP is to choose the optimal actions for the respective states whelln 'ollsiderillg the
exI)ected rewar(ds/costs of those actions. For infinite horizon )r'oblemslll, a discount factor. .
is used( to alue current rewards over future rewards [14]. Again. the MIarkovian I)roi)erty.
or lack-of-mlelnory roperty.' appI)lies because the transition Iprobabilities are unaffected )by
the states ill sta,[ges prior to the currellt stage [9].
The d(ecision cycle of a MIarkov decision process is as follows:
1. Based oil the current state, all optilmal actioll or decision is chosen froll a set of i)ossible
act ions.
2. The select(edl action deterlnlines the prol)abilities of transitioning into a nlew state.
3. All immellleiate reward/cost is incurred.
4. The state of the system is determlilned after each transition.
5. The process is repeated.
A complete policy for the MiDP is a spIecification of the optimlal actions for each state.
A solution maps a state to an action (S - A) where s C S and a E A. The objective is to
find all optimal policy of actions considering both immrnediate and terminal rewards.
Markov decision p)rocesses are an imnportant class of problemlls that are often solvable
through (ynamic p)rogranmgilg . There are solution nlethods for MDPs that run in poly-
nomial time in IS. AI. allnd finite horizon or infinite horizon writh a discount of -1,. The
concept of dynllamic progralmling applied to MIDPs forms the basis for the focus of this
thesis: partially observable Markov decision processes.
2.3 Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
A Markov decision process as defined in Section 2.2 assumes that the environment is fully
observa.ble. This means that thile state of the systei is always known with certainty. However,
in many real-world problems the environment is only partially observable, and the state of
the system may not be known with certainty. As all examnple this I)artia.l knowledge mnay
occur if the observer is removed from te process in some way and must gain information
over an impnIerfect communicatiolls channel [16]. In the world of ballistic missile defense,
human operators are forced to rely on sensors and radar to determine the status of incoming
ballistic missiles.
Using an MIDP to model this type of partial observability falls short as step one of the
decision cycle is not possible. In order to model systems with these characteristics. they are
defined as partially observable Markov decision processes (POMIDP). The POMDP. originally
developed by Drake [8], but. formalized by Sondik [16], is "the specification of a sequential
decision probleml for a. partially observable environmlent with a IMarkovian transition model
and additive rewards" [14]. A POMDP is an MDP tha.t handles the case in which states
can "look" the same or where the sarme state can "look" different each time it is visited. A
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P(0)IDP is dlefile(ld )by six primllary colmponents:
1. A set of states: s E S
2. A set of actions for each state: a( E .A
3. A transition niodel: T(s. a,.s')
4. A set of observations: o E 0
5. All observation model: O(s. o. ea. s')
6. A reward filnction for both intermediate and termlinal rewards for each state: R(,s. o. a. s')
These elements are defined in mnore detail and in terlns of the single engagelent prol)leln in
Chapter 4.
A POMDP lhas the same elements as an MIDP with the addition of the set of observations
and the observation model. The observation model specifies the probability of perceiving
ob)servation given that the system started in state s. ended in state s'. and took action 
to get there. In addition. the reward function may now also depend on observation o.
In IDPs the optimal action depends only on the c(urrent state, and a solution mnaps a
state to an action. Inl POMDPs the current state is not known. so there is no way to inap
a tate to anl action. NWithout knowing the current state. th( optimial action d(epends on
the comIplete history of the system. including the initial information about the system. as
well as all subsequent actions and observations. Sondik provedl that a sufficient statistic for
this compnlete history of the system is the belief state [16]. A belief state. b E (S). is the
probability distribution over all possible states where II(S) is the set of all possible belief
states [14]. Let b)(s) be the probability of being in the actual state .s given the belief state
b.. In a P()MIDP. tile optimal action depends only on the system's current belief state [14].
A solution mnaps the belief state to an a.ction ((S) -- A). A graphical depiction of a two
state belief state is shown in Figure 2-1. In this two-state POMIDP. the belief state an be
replresented by a single probability. p. of being in one state. The probability of being in the
oth].er state is siniply 1 - p. Therefore, the entire belief space can be represented as a line
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Figure 2-1: Two-state Belief State
segment. The point at 0 on the line segment indicates there is no way the systeml is in state
s candl must be in state s,2. Likewise. the point 1 on the line segment indicates the system
is in state s with certa.inty alld there is no chance of being in state *s2. This means that
b = (p, 1 - p) where b(sj) = p and b(s2 ) = (1 - p).
While the MIarkovian property does not hold for the state of the system, it does hold for
the belief state of the svstemI. The optimal policy for any given stage is only dependent on
the current, belief state and not decisions made in previous stages.
The decision cycle in a POMIDP formulation is now:
1. Based on the current belief state. an optimal action or decision is chosen from a set of
possible actions.
2. The selected action determines the probabilities of transitioning into a new state.
3. An observation on the state of the system is made.
4. An immediate reward/cost is incurred.
5. The new belief state is calculated based onI the action and observation after each
transition.
6. The process is repeated.
The current belief state can be calculated as the conditional probability distribution over
the actual states given the previous observations a.nd actions so far. If b was the previous
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lelief state. ac(til l was taken. allnd observatiol (o was plerceiveld . then tile new elief state.
h'. i calculated for each state. .s'. by Equation 2.1.
O(.s'. (. o) s T(s. ( .')b(.s) (2.1)
h (s ) = Pr~olfl h) (2.1)
Pr(o[kl. 1))
Th11e (tenolilllator normllllizes the resulting belief state so that it sils to one. and( call be
colnIll)ute(d bv E(lqlation 2.2.
Pr(ola. b) ' [ (I.0.. 1. T(s;. . s')lb(s) (2.2)
As anll exaiille of uipdating the belief state. assume the system has two pIossible states
(sl anld s,). two possille actions ( and 2). alld to plossible o)servatiolls ( andl( 0).
A gra)hic'al rel)esentationl is shown in Figure 2-2. The larger black (lot represents the
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Figure 2-2: Updating tile Belief State
starting belief state. and each of the slaller dots represent a possible resultinlg belief state
givell a certain action and observation. The arcs linking these belief states represenlt the
transfornlition of belief states by Equation 2.1. In this exampille there are oly ftour new
pc(,ssible belief states; one for each colbination of actiolls and observations.
A collmplete policy for the PONIDP is a spIecification of tile optimaill actions for each b)elief
state. The objective is to filid a optimal policy of actions colnsidering both immllmediate
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and termina.l expected rewards. However. the challenge in finding an optimal policy for a
PONIDP is that. unlike the (liscrete state spa-ce in an MIDP, the belief space for a PONMDP is
c'ontinuous. Ill conlltrast to \IDPs. the )belief state probalilities create a state space of infinite
size. To deal with this. the belief space can be partitioned into regions where certain actions
are optilllal and the long-term value is a linear funclltion of the belief state.
Assume now that the system has three possible actiollns. The belief space could be p)ar-
titioned into three regions where each of these actions is ol)timal as shown in Figure 2-3.
These lines in two imlnensions, and hyperplanes ill greater dimlensions, are called alpha. vec-
O a a2 a 3
Figure 2-3: Belief State with Value Function
tors. They are simply vectors with a value for ea.ch state, and correspond to anl action. An
action is optimal where its alpha vector dominates other alpha. vectors. Graphicallyv this
means one alphlla vector lies above another. The value function for a POMDP, V(b). is simply
the upper surface of the alpha vectors over the belief space-a piecewise linear combination
of the alpha vectors. V(b) is a mapping of the belief space to the expected total reward [7].
Because the value function is piecewise linear and convex, the belief space can be partitioned
into regions where certain actions are optiimal. Despite the simplicity of Figure 2-3. a belief
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Sla(e 1av 1 e )artitiolle( ito lnanY iorllre regions than actions. land therefore all actionll ('all
1e' optimal ill several different regiolns. The b)elief state (all also be represente(d as a vector
with prob),;llilitics for eacl state. Finding thle optilllal action for a given belief tate requires
alllatillg thle (,:t i)rod(lllt of the belief state vector and each alpl)ha ve(tor and finding which
(lot )rodu(t has tile greatest value.
2.4 Mathematical Approaches
()ne plreviolls appllro(h to I)rol)lellls siilar to the sillgle enlgagellenlt problelll i the weap)oll-
targetll t assiglllllLt (WTA) plroblem. Ill tlle static W TA. weaplons are assignlle( to targets in
(order to liilllize either the total exp)ected( llullllber or the expe(ted( value of the remainilln
talrgets [10]. A value is assiglned to each target. and each eaI)on-target pIair has a kill
pr('llaility assxo(iated witil it. This i tle problability that a (ertain weapon will destroy a
('ertaill target. T''lle assignlllent of a weapolln to a target is independent of all other weapons
a l.L(l targets.
A (vlaillli weapo-target assigllet problem is a static- weaIon-target assignlllllent prob-
1u1ll tllat ilvolves Illllltiple stages. This lllealls that the outonllle of al assiglllllent in olne
st ge calll affec(t the assiglllllellt ill tlle nllet stage. Eachll stage onsists of two steps:
1. Determline whllic( targets have survived the assignment ill the previous stage.
2. Assign a subset of tle rellaining weapons to the targets that survived based oil the
object ive.
The llissile lefense single engagemllent prollelll canll be defined as a dlYllallic weapon-
target assigmllllelt problelm. In this appIlicatioll. the weapons are inter(eptor missiles or
kill vehlicles. all( the targets are in(olming missiles. A certain portion of thile illnventory of
initerelptor missiles (the weapons) mulst be assigilel to a numlber of incolling missiles (the
targets). In a single engagement there are two stages, so that the outollle of the first
sllhot" ill stage 1 inlav determine the assignment of interceptor missiles for the secoid shot"
in stage 2. The obje('tive may be to linimlIize the probability an inlolillg issile leaks
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through defenses. to minimize the dlamage done if incoming missiles are headed for different
locations, or a variety of other potential objectives. The objective function may also be a
weighted function maximizing not only the prob)a.bility of no leakage. but also the remaining
intercepltor nlissiles left in inventory.
In this probleln all incoming lissiles (targets) are assuined to have the same value.
In addition, because all intercelptors are assumed to be identical, all kill pIroba.bilities are
a.ssumned equal. With these assumptions Hosein, Walton, and Athans showed that in a
dynamic pIrobleml with N targets and Al weapons. it is optima.l to spread the wea.pons
evenly allmong all targets at each stage. In addition. given a two-stage problem in which
Al > N with A11 being the munlber of assigned weapons in stage one and Il2 being the
number of assigned weapIons ill stage two. it was shown that the optimal assignment has the
property tha.t Al1 > N [10].
These conclusions prove to be very useful ill solving the single engagement problem.
However, the addition of imperfect kill assessment. after the first stage makes it more difficult
to use the weapon-target assignment formulation. Under impIerfect information, step one
of each stage becomes very challenging: determine which targets have survived the last
assignment. This information is no longer known with certainty and this makes it much
more difficult to accomplish step two: assign weapons to the targets which survived.
2.4.1 Applicability to Other Problems
By no means is this probletl only applicable to ballistic missile defense. The work on
this problem c.an easily be applied to a wide range of battle management problems. Mlore
specifically, the issues of a limited time window. linmited resources. imperfect kill assessment,
and severe consequences for every action are very relevant to many defense and non-defense
related problems. As an example of a type of problem that could be formulated in this
manner, we consider the use of unmanned aeria.l vehicles (UAVs) for reconnaissance and
surveillance. A limited number of UAVs may be assignled to a number of different ground
targets. Information on these targets nay be required in a timely manner. Imagery from
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the UA\s iiia\ not be cm111l)lete or conclusive. 1)lit assigining more UAVs to a target may,
il.inrove the information received. Assigning more UAVs to a target mlay comel at soIle cost.
sichll as losilng inf'rmnationl froim other targets. This is one examlI)le of a pIroblel to which
tile applroach in this thesis llmay also applI)ly.
2.5 Chapter Summary
'This chapter p)rogressed( through a discussion of the mathematical tools used in this thesis
begiming with the general technique called dynanic Iprogranfniing. a class of pIroblenis called
Marko\v (tdecision l)rocesses. and ending with a variallt of AIDPs. the I)artially observable
Markov (decisioll Iprocess. All of the. nine chara(teristics of dillamic prograInmlliing prollellls
previously d(escribed( are appIlicable to the POIDP when applied to the single engagement
pro)leml. Ill Iarticular. POM\IDPs are solved l)a ckwar(ls iteratively. The basis for the PO\IDP
is te IMarkov (hecision process and its four prillary elements. The POMIDP is simlply an
MIDP with only p)artial knowledge of the state. This comnllicatioin adds two new elements to
tlle IDP: the set of observations andl the observation model. Instead of making decisions
base(l oil the current state. dec(isions nlust be made based o the belief state. a probability
distrilbutioll oer all states.
Previouslv. Hosein. Walton, and Athans formlulated the single ballistic nmissile engage-
inilnt as a wea)O-target assignment problem. Using this formulation, several key results
were proved( about the otimal assignlent of interceI)tors to incoming missiles. While this
formulation provides valuable insight into this problenl. it fails to account for the imperfect
kill assessment in the G.MD. Lastly. we discuss the applicability of our approach to other
problems. The value of formulations accounting for iperfect information transcend ballis-
tic missile defense. This approach could be applicable to any problemln dealing with limited
resources. uncertainty, and assignments.
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Chapter 3
Problem Formulation
This (lhalI)t1r (11I isses the tihree ciases we use to assess the ilmpallct of illl)elrfect information
on the single elagellelt pIroblleml. These three cases describ)e different assUmptiOls anll
realities ill the single egagemenlt p)robleml: a sstelll that hals I)erfect kill assessment. Ca
sysitemll that assiLues p)erfect kill assessment incorrectly. and a systeml that makes decisions
takiiing the impIerfect kill assessment into accouIlt. We formulate the third case as a partially
obsercvablfe Iarlkor dlecisionl Iprocess (POMDP). Ill order to assess the erforlllmance of this
approach. we ('com)pare it to the other two c'ases.
3.1 Perfect Information
In the b)est case. Case 1. the informationl received( after the first action would be colmpletely
acculate. Ill this Ier'fect informaltion" case, the p)robalbility of oserving a mliss given a
iss al(tuallv oc'urreld. Pr(roissll.'s.s). and the probability of observing a hit given a hit
atually occurre(l. Pr(hit1it). would both equal one. The assumpItion that all observation
is coplll)letely accuralte simplifies te problem. Case 1 dlescribes te assumptions of previous
work conducted on the single egagelmenlt p)ro)lem.
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3.2 Imperfect Information Assumed Perfect
Given that previous formulations of this prollenl have assuneld perfect information. an
ilnl)ortant situation to analyze is one where Pr(7mi.ssmliss) # 1 and Pr(hithit) ~ 1. et
the policy is created assunlling that Pr(mis.s-iss) = 1 and Pr(hl.it;hit) = 1. This mneans
that the observations of which incollling targets were hit and missed are taken to be true.
even though there is a. chance those observations are incorrect. These assumptions could
have disastrous consequences in an actual engagement. If an incoming target were falsely
believed to be destroyed. and consequently no nlore iltercepltors were fired a.t it. it would be
allowed to leak through defenses without bleillg engaged. We refer to this situation as Case
2. In this case the decisions are made with the same assumnptions as the first case. Reality.
however, is different.
3.3 Imperfect Information: POMDP Formulation
In Case 3, the imperfect information froil sensors after the first shot is known and the policy
solution attempts to account for it. In order to do this. the single engagement problem is
modeled as a partially observable Ma.rkov decision process (POIMDP). This PONIDP ha.s a
horizon of two stages to model the "shoot-look-shoot" aspect of the probleln. Each decision
or "shot." is the action of that stage.
States
We define a state, s, as the following:
,s= (/L p)
where /3 is the interceptor inventory remaining and p is the number of targets remaining.
Given this state definition, a.n initial interceptor inventory /30. and an initia.l wave of targets
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pl. the size of the state space is:
( 3,o + 1)(po + 1)
Ad(ling 1 to both ,3( and P0 ill this exI)lression. ac(counts for the states ill wich ! = 0 or
:= ().
Actions
W e define an a.ction. a( E A, as the total umlber of interceptors assigned to all targets. given
the current state. s. Manyl logical restrictions could be plla.ced on the action. As an example
of an action that could be restricted. consider the action of assigning fewer interceptors than
tairgets eveln with enough inter(eptors ill inventory. This action would allow a target to pass
through defenses without being elngaged. and appears not to be logical. However. in our
for)mulation the only restriction placed on the allowable actions is a < /. By assigning a
large negative value in the reward function. these impossible actions. in which a > 3, are
restricted. Although this is the only restriction placed on actions. in theory an optillal
policy will not cloose illogical actions given the proper reward( filnction. Given the state.
s = (. p). the numlber of allowable actions is equlal to '3 + 1.
'Transition Model
In our formulation the only uncertainty affecting the transition fronl one state to another
is the single-shot I)robability of kill (SSPK), which is the probability a single interceptor
hits a single target. The probability of transitioning from state s S to state s' E S after
taking action a A is denoted by T(s. a. s'). The transition model is the three-dimensional
matrix of all of these values. Assuming that the interceptors are evenly distributed amolg all
ta-rgets. either all targets will have the same number of interceptors assigned to them, or one
group of ,91 targetts will have n, interceptors assigned to them and the remainling 92 targets
will have n. - 1 iiterceptors assigned to them. As an exalmple, if 7 interceptors were assigned
to 3 targets. one target would have three intercep)tors assigned to it. and two targets would
each have two interce)tors assigned to them. This means that gY = 1 target. 2 = 2 targets.
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and r1 = 3 interceptors. Let PKl and PA 2 equal the overall probl)ability of no leakage for
one target given the nlulber of interceptors assigned to each target ill the groups containing
g1 anlld 92 targets respectively. P 1 allnd PK, c'all be calculated( using Equation 3.1 and
Equation 3.2.
PIiM = 1 - (1 - SSP)" (3.1)
PK2 = I - (1 - SSPK)( "- 1) (3.2)
Let h be the number of hits or number of targets destroyed. This value is calculated by
Equation 3.3.
1, = pR - R, (3.3)
Because there may be two groups of targets with PK1 and Pi 2 associated with them. there
are malny combinations of hits from each of the two groups of targets that result in the same
number of overall hits and thulls the same transition. To calculate the transition probabilities,
T(s. a, s'), Equation 3.4 sums over all possible combinations that result in the same number
of hits.
h
T(s. a. s') = [ [(9l)PK9I(1 - PA)'1] [(92 i)PK292+i(l - PK2)92] VE.SVS'ESVa<
i=0
(3.4)
It should also be noted that for any a.ction, a, the transition probabilities suml to one over
the ending states:
rT(s. a, s') = 1
s'ES
Observation Model
The observation model is the main component that differentiates a POMDP from an MIDP. In
this problem the observation probability, (0(s', a, o), is based on the probabilities Pr(mnissl miss)
and Pr(hitjhit). Table 3.1 depicts a confusion matrix of these probabilities. Ultimately, the
observation model is a three-dimensional matrix dependent on the starting state, action, and
resulting state.
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Observedl
Hit \iiss
Actu al Hit Pr(hitllit) Pr(mnis.slhit)
Miss Pr( hitjmiss) Pr(miss. miss)
Table 3.1: Confilsionll Iatlix
Ill order to calculate thle observation lprobal)ilities we define the following variablles:
Variable Definition
P,,M7 T Pr(m.i.lssl miss)
Ph.77, Pr(hit'mi.ss)
Phh/_ Pr(litlh.it)
P,, h Pr(ri.s s | it )
110 nulmber of observed target l misses
h1 nunliber of ob)served target hits
711, number of actual target nlisses
h1, nmunl)er of actual hits
lb lower blound on mnumber of actual mnisses
'ub upper bound oil number of actual nlisses
Table 3.2: Variable Definition for Observatioll Probabilitv Calculation
where lb = 1max(O, (tno- ha)) and ub = miri(nm. m,,) ill order to accOlllt for the correct
combinations of possible observations. Equation 3.5 shows the equation to calculate each
observatioin probability, where O(s', a. o) = Pr(o s'. a).
ub
()(.a. o) = [ [(a )
i:=lb
rPm( - P, ,)' -] [(, - - J i (
.n.o- i) Pma, - PI.)11),- (7,7,-i)] ]
where
O(s',a. o) = 1
oEO
Reward Model.
The objective of the single engagement problem is to ilinimize the p)robability that any
targets leak throulgh defenses while maxinlizing the number of interceptors left in ilnvenltory
after the engagemIenelt. To reconcile these two comipeting objectives a weight, iul is used.
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(3.5)
where 0 < l 'I < 1.0. Let P,,.I equal the probability of no leakage for the entire single
engagement. The reward function in Equation 3.6 balances the percenta.ge of initial inventory
of interceptors renmaining and the probability that no targets leak through defenses after the
transition. We sale the remaining inventory by the initial inventor i order for 0 < t. < 1
just as 0 < P,, < 1. A u1 ' close to zero tells the POnIDP solver to be nuch more conservative
with its inventory of interceptors, while a ui close to one tells the POMIDP solver to value
mllnimizing leakage much iliore than saving intercei)tors. This weight is varied in subsequentl
exI)erimlellts to determine its ill)a.ct on engageIment success.
R(s, o. .s') = ( 1.) (+) + t'l PI (3.6)
In the context of this problemn, as with many PONIDPs. the ending state is more iml-
portant than the intermediate states. For example, targets remaining after the final shot
have far more severe consequences than targets remaining when there is still one shot left at
them. To account for this characteristic, terminal rewards can be specified for the PONIDP.
These rewards simply place a value ol each of the possible final states. The terminal reward
function in this problem took the form of Equation 3.7. where WTrl is the weight given to the
inventory remaining and uT2 is the weight given to the targets remaining. In this equation,
/3, is not scaled as it is in the intermediate reward function. because its competing metric is
Ps, which is the number of targets remailing.
F(s) = WT1,/3 - wT2Ps (3.7)
3.4 Chapter Summary
This chapIter discusses the three cases to be used for comparison to assess the effect of
imperfect information on interceptor assignment. Tile first case assumes (correctly) perfect
information from sensors. The second case assumes (incorrectly) perfect information from
sensors in a world where information is not. perfect. The third case attempts to account for
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illperf'l(t iforlllltioll ill its decisionll akin. The focus of this (hapIter is the ast case.
whichl is fornmulated as a artially o)servable Mlarkov dec(ision l)ro(ess.
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Chapter 4
Implementation
Thllis ( haplter dis usses the lethodologyl used to solve allnd test each of tle three c Eases outlined
iln Chapter 3. \\e )egin with a lescril)tion of the lnaxilllllll marginal return (MMIR) algo-
ritlllll used to llke assignmellnts for Cases 1 and 2. Next. we discuss tile PO\IDP solution
algoritllllls used i Case 3. \We then outline how these algorithms are use(1 ill tlle solution
i):o('ess. Finally. e disculss the experilellntal (lesignl tilized to compl)are the l)erforlllan(ce of
thle three cases.
4.1 MMR Algorithm
Althllollugh they deal with different information certailty. the first to cases described in
Chllapter 3 se the same1 algorithmlllll to mnake interceptor assiglllellnts: the Ilaxilliull iilarginal
retluI11 (1I\IR) algoritlllll. The \IIR algorithm variant ilsed in this work assiglns illterceI)tors
to targets i a single engagemlelnt. Tle objective of this algorithll is to liliinlize the nlullll)er
of interceptors uised while lneetillg a probability of no leakage thllreshllold. Tllese two goals ale
ill ol)positionl to Eachl other. Ill order to do this, te algorithllllln iteratively assigins itercepltors
to targets one-at-a-tiime ulltil eithler tile overall p)robability of no leakage reaches the thlreshold
Or l1o illtercel)tors relain in inventory. The threshold( for thlis MI5IR version is 0.99 to focus
oil Silliizing F1,,l withlout usilng all inventory. If the threshold was Pr, = 1.(). the algorithli
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would consistenltly use all intercep)tor inventory. After each iteration. every target's marginal
probailityS of leakage is alculated an( the target with the highest probability is the next
target to gain another interceptor assignllent in the following iteration.
The i\IMR algorithml also assigns interce)tors to one of the two time stages. For instance,
the algorithlnm initially a.ssigns sonle interceptors for stage one ad some for stage two. but
the assigned interceptors fr stage two are not actuallv fired in stage one. but are plalned to
be fired. In this way the algoritllhm chooses the best two-stage strategy, with the knowledge
that it will reI)lan after kill assessment of the first stage. After the assignment is made in
stage one. the algorithm is run again to make a new assignment for stage two based on the
nunml)er of targets that still remain. During tle first assignment, when determining which
time stage to assign an interceptor, if none have been assigned to a target, the assignment
is made to the first time stage. Otherwise. the assignment is made to the stage with fewer
interceptors assigned. with the second stage gaillillg the assignment in the event of a tie.
This second stage preference provides the same probability guarantee with fewer expected
interceptors used. A description of this algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.1.
Algorithm 4.1 Maximum MIarginal Return Algorithm
B 1 /
P,, <= O
while P,,r < 0.99 and B > 0 do
for all p targets do
Find target with highest probability of leakage
Assign one interceptor to that target
if In stage 1 then
if First interceptor assigned to target then
Interce)tor assigned to first stage
else if Each stage has equal interceptors assigned then
Interceptor assigned to second stage
else
Interceptor assigned to stage with fewer interceptors assigned
Recalculate P,,, based on new assignments
B B-1
The MMR. algorithm was tested on a varietv of scenarios of varying interceptors and
targets under the Case 1 assumptions. The algorithm provides a policy solution and firom
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tllrlt I)olicy a I)robal)bility of no leakage as well as an estilate inventory rellaililng are
cal(ulate(l for each scenario. These mneasures of performance. P,, alnd ,l, . are cal(lllated
using SSPK. The values shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. were est.ilmated( using MIonte
Carlo( simulation of 10.()()000 trials of the single engagement assuming l SSPIK = 0.8. These
prol)al)ilities provide a good benchmark for thile probabilities for the other cases. Likewise.
thll average remaining inventory for Case 1 rovides a good ben(lllark for the other cases
remallining inventory. Hypl)othetically. P, 4 is greater in this case. than in the case in which
the information is iperfect.
T'able 4.1: Probability
rithl.. SSPK = 0.8
of No Leakage with Perfect Infornmation (Case 1) using MNIR Algo-
4.2 POMDP Solver
To solve the POIDP used in Case 3, we use the software pomdp-solve, version 4.0. developed
by Cassandra [6i. Using a. basic dynamnic progralmming approach working backwards in
tilne. this software can use a variety of different algorithms to solve the POMIDP. It is
capallle of solvillg both finite and infinite horizon problems and implemlents a number of
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Interceptors Targets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.7961 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ()
2 0.9593 0.6i403 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0.9922 0.8963 0.5076 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0.9984 0.9708 0.8214 0.4059 0 0 0 0
5 0.9984 0.9888 0.9438 0.7445 0.3294 0 0 0 0
(i 09982 0.9931 0.9737 0.9020 0.6626 0.2675 0 0 0
7 0.9982 0.9968 0.9872 0.9504 0.8541 0.5773 0.2060() 0 0 0
8 0.9980 0.9973 0.9911 0.9(775 0.9173 0.7915 0.5084 0.1671 0 0
9 (.9980 0.9985 0.9957 0.9812 0.9572 0.8794 0.7371 0.4406 0.1277 0
10() 0.9987 0.998 0.9963 0.9910 0.9684 0.9376 0.8428 0.6811 0.3731 0.1093
11 0.9979 0..9982 0.9975 0.9927 0.9879 0.9515 0.9047 0.8052 0.6194 0.3166
12 0.9985 0.9977 0.9988 0.9943 0.9871 0.9764 0.9325 0.8779 0.7610 0.5655
1_ 3 0.9988 0.9977 0.9990 0.9952 0.9915 0.9810 0.9664 0.9153 0.8439 0.7125
14 0.9987 0.9981 0.9995 0.9968 0.9943 0.9898 0.9746 0.9510 0.8915 0.8094
15 0.9982 0.9982 0.9991 0.9974 0.9951 0.9910 0.9843 0.96f10 0.9326i 0.8599
1( 0.9984 (.9984 0.9996 0.9988 0.9957 0.9928 0.9880 0.9753 0.9526 0.9086
Interceptors Targets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0 () 0 0 0 0 0 0 () 
2 0.8012 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 1.613 0.639 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 2.4 1.2772 0.5181 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 3.4081 1.9284 1.0178 0.4146 0 0 O 0
6 4.4102 2.8783 1.5303 0.8242 0.3323 0 0 0 0 0
7 5.4009 3.296(i4 2.4007 1.2546 0.6544 0.2624 0 ) 0
8 6.385 4.2925 3.3375 2.0682 0.9771 0.5216 0.2056 0 0 0
9 7.4147 5.2842 4.2498 2.8728 1.727 0.7743 0.4052 0.1688 0 0
10 8.3841 6.2662 4.6554 3.6867 2.439:3 1.4451 0.6363 0.3236 0.1334 0
11 9.3958 7.2503 5.1462 4.4978 3.165:3 2.0832 1.2433 0.4938 0.2654 0.104
12 10.384 8.2628 5.6412 5.3329 3.!)222 2.7741 1.7757 0.9779 0.3978 0.2114
13 11.402 9.2543 6.6572 5.907 4.6885 3.4174 2.3616 1.519 0.8415 0.3273
14 12.392 10.267 7.6374 6.4342 5.6035 4.091 2.9768 2.0154 1.2544 0.7169
15 13.408 11.266 8.6178 6.9909 6.517 4.943 3.5021 2.4982 1.6992 1.0675
16 14.39 12.252 9.6342 7.4991 7.1632 5.8672 4.3381 3.024(6 2.1616 1.4079
Table 4.2:
Algoritlhm,
Average Inventory
SSPK = 0.8
Remaining with Perfect Information (Case 1) using MIMR
algorithms inchluding the enumeration. witness. and incremental pruning algorithms. The
software requires an input file specifying the number of states. actions. and observations.
as well as the complete transition model. observation model, and reward model. WVe wrote
and used an inl)ut file writer to create such an input file. The input file writer begins with
the basic settings: /3. Po. SSPK. Phh,. P,,,, and wll. It then calculates the transition
probabilities. observation probabilities. and reward matrix using the equations described ill
Chapter 3 and then writes themn to a file.
4.2.1 POMDP Solution Algorithms
Ever since Sondik's formalizatioll of tihe POIMDP and his "One-Pass Algorithm," [16], so-
lution algorithms for POMDPs have been proplosed and researched. Because the ballistic
missile defense single engagement problem is a "shoot-look-shoot" problem with two possible
actions. it has a. horizon of only two. Therefore. only finite-horizon algorithms are discussed
in this section. All finite-horizon algorithms follow thile same general structure as shown in
Figure 4-1. First, the O-epoch value function, Vo(b), is constructed using the terminal values.
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Initialize final stage with
O-epoch alpha vector set
to terminal values
i
Find next epoch
value function
No
Current epoch = Horizon ?
Yes
Return optimal policy
Figure 4-1: Finite-horizon PONIDP Algorithml Structure
Termllinal values place a reward or cost on each state for the final stage of the system. Next.
the value function for the next epoch is compl)uted. This dynamic programming update of
the value function for each belief stage works backwards iteratively firom the filnal stage in a
recursive llannec:L until the epoch equals the horizon of the problelll. This process defines a
new value fiunction. V'(b), froml the current value function. V(b) as shown in Eqluation 4.1
[7.
V'(b) = max [Y R(s. a)b(s) + Z Pr(ola, b)V(b') (4.1)
(lEA I-0
LSES oEO
This equation states that the value finction for a. belief state, b. is the value of the best action
I:ossille from b of the expected immediate reward for tha.t action plus the expected value
of the resulting belief state. b. This dynamic programming update is conducted until the
horizon is reached. At that point. an optima.l policy is produced [18]. This policy specifies
tile best action to take at that stage given the observation.
The main distinction between POMDP solution algorithms is the way they generate a
finite set of points to build the alpha vectors for the value function. The process of finding
dolinant alpha vectors requires the use of linear programlning. It should be noted that
in somle problenls it is difficult. to find regions where one alpha vector dominates others.
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This may ('ause nunlerical istability in the linear plrogralIinng plroblenls. The work in this
thesis investigated three primary algorithmls to solve the POMNDP: Monallha' s enumerative
algorithlni. Littlllan's witness algorithmll, and Zhang and Liu's incremlental pruning algorithln .
Enumeration Algorithm: This type of algorithnl. which was mnentioiled by Solldik in
1971. but formalized by M\lonahan ill 1982. (loes not actually try to find a finite set of points
to build the alpha vectors [6]. Instead it simply enumerates all alpha vectors [12]. From
this superset of vectors. extraneous vectors are deleted if they are dominated by others.
Ultimately the algoritlm generates a set of dominant allha vectors of mlinimal size. The
problem with this algorithm is that the lnumber of alpha. vectors becolles very large as the
horizon or number of epochs in thle probleln increase [6]. Even using the simple examlple in
Figure 2-2 with two actions and two observations. the number of alpha. vectors can become
very large. This probleln starts with only one alpha vector at the -epoch. which is the
terminal value fimction. At each epoch the nulber of alpha vectors grows exponentially, so
the total numlber of alpha. vectors is doubly exponential in the horizon. It is clear that more
complex problems with more possible actions and observations would require the generation
of an excessively large number of alpha. vectors. For this reason, enumerative algorithms are
best suited to plroblems with small nmnbers of actions. observations, and a short horizon.
Witness Algorithm: This algorithnl, developed by Littman. Cassandra. and Ka.elbling,
differs in the way it finds a set of alpha vectors of nminimal size [11]. Instead of enumerating
all possible alpha vectors and paring that set down, it builds up to that set one vector
at a time. The witness algorithm defines regions for an alpha vector and looks for places
where the vector is not dominant [11]. It starts with an arbitrary belief state. and finds
the dominant alpha. vector for this belief state. While it is known that the alpha vector is
optimal for this point.. it is not known where this vector is not dominant. The algorithm
then defines a region of the belief space for this alpha vector and then searches for a point.
where it is not dominant. Unlike other algorithms, the witness algorithm defines a value
function in this manner for each action separately. Then, it combines the value fnctions in
the end to create the final value function. In addition to maximizing over actions in isolation.
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tl:Lh' itness algorithin (leals with on1 observatioll at a time. In choosing a vector for eac'h
olbservation. it ('ooses all action. The algorithm then searches one ol)servation at a tinle for
a hlloice that imlllroves the overall value. If it finds all action alld ('corres)onding vector that
iln)l'\ves the ivalue fiunction, then that serves as witlless that the current value function is
not the final value fun('tion [6].
Incremental Pruning Algorithm: This algorithmlllll. originally proposed(l b Zhang and
Liui [19)] but de(velopeld by Cassandra. Littmanl. and Zhalg [7]. is the latest and fastest
algoritlllml for solving P()OMIDPs. It conllines elements of Monahan's enumeration algorithl
anll( the witness algorithm [6]. Instead of finding the regions where alllha vectors olinllate.
this algorithllm focuses on finding different comlbillations of flture strategies. It begins by
;elneratillg all)la vectors for a fixed ac'tion and observation. These vec(tors are olll)pared and
doinnate(l vecto:rs are relnoved. creating a domlinant set of alI)ha vectors for only this action
and o)bser\vation. Froml there. the sets are combined for all the observations anll doninated
vectors are reml:oved. creating a dominant set of alpha. vectors for each action. Finally,. the
sets for each action are conmbined and dominated vectors are relnoved. creatillg the value
filnction. V'(b).
4.3 Solution Process
'Thlle assunll)tions of this thesis make the single engagement a stochastic process ba-sed oil
several probalbilities: SSPK. Ph, and Pr,,. In order to deterline how the policies generated
by the INMMR algorithm and the POMIDP solver perforrim, we used a Ml\onte Carlo simulation
of the single engageIment. to calculate estimates for P,, and /32. This sirnulationl can be run
Using either the M\INIR algorithnl for Case 2 or the POMDP solver solutionl for Case 3. The
lonte Carlo sinlulation for Case 1 is nuch simpler. as PI,,, = 1 and P,,,,,, = 1. Therefore,
the ollly uncertaillty comes from SSPK.
Figure 4-2 dep)icts the solution process for Case 2. In this case. the input file writer beginls
with the basic settings: intercet)tors. targets, SSPK. P,,,, P,,,,, and 'u1L. It thenl calculates
the transition probabilities and the observation probabilities. All of the iitial settings. the
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Input File Writer
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Number of states
Transition Model
Observation Model
Observation
MMR Algorithm mulation 
Optimal Policy
Probabill of No Leakage
Average Inventory Peraining
Figure 4-2: Solution Process Using IMM\IR Algorithm
transition model. andl the observation model are then used by the silnulation. To deterllline
the actions. the simulation calls the MMR algorithm, which takes the observation as the true
nummber of targets remaining. The M:INIR, algorithlm thell I)rovi(les an optimal policy back
to the simulation. The single engagement is simulated many times for the same settings in
order to calculate average mea-sures of perfornlall(e.
WVhen using the simulation with the POMNDP solver of Case 3, the program flow is
as depicted in Figure 4-3. As with Case 2, the input file writer begins with the basic
settings and produces an inlIut file for the simulation. In addition, it also produces two
input files for the POMIDP solver: one containing the transition model, observation model.
and reward function and one containing the terminal rewards for each state. WVith these input
files, the POMIDP solver uses the selected POMDP solution algorithm. such as incremental
pruning, and produces a solution file containing alpha vectors and their associated actions.
After translating this file into a matrix for the alpha vectors and a. vector for the actions
corresponding to each alpha. vector, the simulation uses themi along with the initial settings
froml the input file writer. Again the simulation is run nmany times to estimate average
probability of no leakage and average inventory remaining. The entire process depicted in
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Figure 4-3: Solution Process Using POMDP Solver
Figure 4-2 for Case 2 and Figure 4-3 for Case 3 combine to forml one run of each exp)eriment
to be described in detail in the following section.
The simlulation was developed to rn a simulated single engagement a large uImber of
times to gain an accurate assessment of the strategy and settings chosen based on several
response variables. It begins by using either the MI\IR algorithml or the POMlDP solution
p)(licy to determine an initial action. If the simulation is using the PONIDP strategy. the
belief state is multiI)lied with each alI)hlla vector to produce a value. The alpha vector resulting
in the highest value corresponds to the best action to take. If the MNIR strategy is used.
the simulation simply invokes the MM\IIR algorithm to determine the best action given the
situation. The algorithm plans the assignment for two stages. and the simulation uses the
first stage assignment as the first action. The simulation then determlines how mlally targets
are in Y1 and 92 and how lnany interceptors are fired at ea.ch target i a rn- 1. resI)ectivelv.
With those values it calculates PKl and PA-2 . It then generates a random number between
zero and one for each target and compares it to PKI or PK 2 . If the rando numlber is
less than P 1 or PKI2. the target is hit. Then. a new random number is generated for
each target. This number is comrnIared to Ph1 if the target was hit and Pm,, if the target
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was missed. If the randon l number is less than Phh or P,,,,7, the observation is correct.
Next, a second action is determined from either the PONIDP solution policy or the \INMR
algorithm based on the observed mnumber of targets remaining. For the POMDP case, this is
acconl)lished by updating the belief state. and nultiplying it with each alpha vector to find
the highest value corresponding to the best action. For the \MMR strategy the algorithm
replans its assignment for stage two based on the new observations, providing the second
action. The process of generating a random number to compare to PK1 and PK 2 is then
repeated to determine the final state of the systeIn. Running this simulation over many trials
produces an average est.inate of the response variables: inventory remaining. targets leaked.
and probability of no leakage. A description of this simulation is depicted in Algorithm 4.2.
4.4 Experimental Design
The experimental design has three separate sets of experiments. First, three initial experi-
ments were run varying factors that are later held constant. In this set of experiments we
screen these variables to determine their effect on system performance. as well as establish
an optimum set of values for the factors. Next, a. central composite design of 87 runs was
conducted varying five different factors at two levels each, in order to see how these factors
and their interactions affected the results. Lastly. one-factor experinments were conducted on
those five factors to determine how they affected the results when varied over a wide range of
values. Whereas, in the second set of designed experiments, we used a CCD to determine if
each factor had significant influence on the response variables, and if there were interactions
between factors. this last set of experiments provides different information by showing the
effect of the input variables over the full spectrum of their possible values.
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Algorithm 4.2 Sillngle Enlgagemllent Simulatioll
I = 0. L < ()
for i = I to t do
h/, ,= (). '111, <= 0. ha0< = 7 0
if Case 2 then
Determilline a fiom INIMR Algoritlhm
else {Ccase 3}
Deteriiiiie (I foll PONIDP all vectors
Calculate . 92. 1. PK1. PK 2
for all Ij targets do
Generate ranldoll lulmber 0 < PKsi, < 1
if PKIx,,, < PKI1 then
Io ~= 1 a + 1
else
for all 92 targets do
Generate randolll nunlber 0 < PIi,,, 1
if PK,i,,, < PKI2 then
11a 11 1a + 1
else
( 4= 'tla + 1
for all p targets do
Generate rand(loll number 0 < Pot, < 1
if Target hit then
if Pos < P, , then
tho : ha, + 1
else
n7 o 4= no + 1
else {Target nliss}
if Pobs :5 Pr.,,,, then
o110 :- I, + 1
else
ho(, = ho + 1
Repeat on(ie
if rma > 0 then
L = L + 
I = I + i
t
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4.4.1 Initial Experiments
The initial experiments started with a baseline scenario that is a combination of input factors
chosen as a likely real-world scenario. W\e then ran three different experiments varying the
algorithm, terminal rewards, and the single-shot probability of kill (SSPK), leaving all other
factors at the baseline level. The purpose of these experilents is to get a general idea. of how
these factors affected the POMIDP solver software, before leaving them constant in the main
experiments. The baseline scenario was first run for 10,00() trials of the simulation with the
settings shown in Table 4.3.
Factor Value
3o 10
Po 3
SSPK 0.8
Psh,. 0.8
Prr, 0.8
wI 0.7
W!TI 1
1''T2 100
Table 4.3: Baseline Scena.rio
Each of the three initial experiments began with the baseline scenario and varied one of
the factors.
Experiment 1: This experiment varied the algorithm used in the POMDP solver software.
The three algorithms examined are enumeration, witness, and incremental pruning.
While Cassandra,. Littman, a.nd Zhang assert that the incremental pruning algorithm
is the fastest algorithm to date, we conduct this experiment to test the algorithms on
our problem. The response variables are the following: solving time. instability, policy
solution, and number of alpha vectors. Each run of this experiment consisted of 10,000
simulation trials.
Experiment 2: This experiment varied the terminal reward function for the POMIDP solver
software. From Equation 3.7, 'WT, and 'uT2 were varied. This experiment set WT2 to
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differenlt o:rders of lnagnitude, and one experimental run also set both lWT anld uWT to
zero. One run also turned off the terminal reward setting for the solver. Each rlll is
compared on the following response variables: solving time. instability. policy solution.
and number of alplha vectors. Due to increased execution tinlme of the simulation. each
run in this experiment consisted of 1.000 simulation trials.
Experiment 3: This experiment varied SSPK at different levels between 0.5 and 1 to
examine its effect on the two cases assuming imperfect information. Due to the con-
siderable t.ime required to generate Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 for the perfect information
case. frther experiments were run using only one value: SSPIK = 0.8. Runs were
compared on the following response variables: policy solution. targets leaked. remain-
ing inventory. and probability of no leakage. Each run in this experimellt also consisted
of 1.000 sinlulation trials.
Table 4.4 sulmnmlarizes these three experiments.
Table 4.4: Initial Experiments
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Experiment Varied Factor Levels Response Variables
_ .Enunmeratioln Solving Time
1 Algorithms \itness InstabilityPolicyv SolutionIncremental Pruning Alpha Vectors
None
ILT, = 0. 1 'T2 = 0 Solving Time
uy!T = . 21.'T = Instability
2 Terminal Rewards, F(s) W!T = 1, w 2 = 10 POIt a1Uit
1T1- 1, T T2= 1000 Alpha Vectors
'__rT = 1 WT.2 = 1000
lTl = 1. UIT2 = 10000
Policy Solution
3 SSPK 0.5 < SSPK < 1 Targets Leaked
-_ - Remaining Inventory
Prob of No Leakage
4.4.2 Central Composite Design Experiment
The purpose of Experiment 4 is to understand how five different factors affect the outcome
using the I\'IR algorithm and the PO\IDP solver. The five factors varied in this experiment
were the number of interceptors ((O), the number of targets (po). the observation probabilities
(Phh and P,,,,,), and the intermediate weight (wI). In order to truly know the effects of the
five factors, including quadratic effects and interactions b)etween factors, a central composite
design (CCD) was used. The importance of this design is two-fold.' First. it allows us to
determine interaction effects of different factors. While "one factor at a time" experiments
may show that the response increases as a. factor increases, it may be true that the response
actually decreases when that factor increases and another factor decreases. This implies
that there is a significant effect on the response by an interaction between the two factors.
If we only examine the effect of a factor as all other factors are held constant we really
do not know how the response performs in other regions of the factor space. As a result.
our conclusions are very dependent on the initial conditions and we may be led to a false
conclusion. Secondly, the CCD allows the fitting of a second-order model [13]. This would
imply that the effect of some factors on the response is not linear. Both of these occurrences
seem likely with respect. to our problem. First, it seems likely that factors such as the number
of interceptors and targets would have significant interaction effects. Secondly, it seems likely
that the effect of some factors on the response is nonlinear given that one response term is
a, probability.
The CCD begins with a 2 factorial design, which sets the five factors a.t a. high and
low level. creating 32 runs for all combinations of each of these levels. Then to check for
curvature, axial runs and center points are added to the design. A center point simply sets
all the factors to a level halfway between the high and low levels. Axial runs set all factors to
the center level and one factor to a certain distance from the design center, a [13]. With five
factors, this experiment had 10 axial poilt.s. A graphical depiction of a two-factor central
coniposite design is shown in Figure 4-4. In order for the model to provide good predictions
throughout the region of interest, the design nmust have rotatability, which means that the
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Figure 4-4: Two-factor Central Composite Design
variance of the predicted response should have equal variance at all design points that are
equal distance from the design center [13]. This is attained by choosing the proper a. In
general. setting = fl/ 4 where f is the number of factorial runs leads to a rotatable
design [13]. In this experiment, nf = 32 so a = 321/4 , 2.378. MIultiplying a by the distance
fronl the factorial points to the design center provides the distance from the axial runs to
the design center for each factor. This distance was rounded to the nearest integer for the
factors 3(% and p.)
Tlle factorial. runs, n f, and the axial runs. n.,. were replicated twice, while the center
point. n was replicated three times for a total of 87 runs. According to XMontgonleryv, three
to five center points provide reasonable stable variance of the response [13]. In experimental
design, replication is used to obtain an estimate of experimental error and to obtain more
precise estimates of the effects of the factors [13]. In this experiment, the same settings
for the POMIDP solver produce the same policy, and the output of the POMIDP solver
provides the input for the simulation. Therefore, the only variation in results conies fromn
the stochastic simulation. If enough trials are used in the simulation, there should be very
little difference in the response variables between replicates of the salne fa.ctor settings.
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Each run in this experiment consisted of 1,00() simulation trials. Table 4.5 shows the design
matrix for this experiment without any of the replicates. Because the POMDP solver, INMMR.
algorithm, and sinullation have no memory. each run is comlI)letely independent. Because
of this independence, randomization of trials is not necessary in this experinlent. and runs
were conducted in the order depicted in Table 4.5.
4.4.3 Single-Factor Experiments
Finally. one-factor experiments were conducted on each of the five factors varied in the CCD.
In each of these experiments. all settings were set to the baseline level, except for the factor
of interest. From there. that factor was varied over a wide range of relevant, values. The
goal of these experiments is to compare the performance of the three cases as each of the
five factors changed over a. wide range of values. They provide a more detailed depiction
of what happens to the response variables as one factor changes. The important response
variables examined in all of these experiments were: policy solution. targets leaked, inventory
remaining, probability of no leakage, and a linear combination of inventory remaining and
probability of no leakage based on the weight. w/1. Except for Experinment 5, each run in all
experiments consisted of 1000 simullation trials.
Experiment 5: This experiment varied the intermediate rewards weight. uwi, used by the
PO1MDP solver software. Vve set 7l to values between zero and one at intervals of 0.1.
Because the IINMMR algorithm does not depend on W1 to make decisions, Case 2 only
required one experimental run. This decreased simulation time greatly and each run
consisted of 10,000 simulation trials.
Experiment 6: This experiment varied P,,, and P,,, simultaneously. While this is not
truly a. single-factor experiment, it was found that varying Phh and Pm,m separately
produced the same results as varying them simultaneously. This experiment set Phh
and P,,,,, to values between 0.5 and 1. While it is possible to examine values between
zero and one. the most relevant values were those in which Phh = Pm,m > 0.5. If sensors
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Run Type (o p P1I l P ,,,, 'I
1 Hnf 7 3 (.6 0.G 0.3
2 1f 11 3 0.6 0.6 0.3
3 'Hf 7 5 0.6 ).(G 0.3
4 f 11 5 0.(6 0.( 0.3
5 I.f 7 3 0.8 ().( 0.3
6 If 11 3 0.8 (). 0.3
7 11 f 7 5 0.8 0.(i 0.3
8 Hf 11 5 0.8 0.(i 0. .3
9 'Hf 7 3 0.6 0.8 0.3
1() if 11 3 0.6 .8 0.3
1 1 f 7 5 0.6 0.8 0.3
12 f 11 5 0.6 ().8 .3
13 'f 7 3 ()0.8 (.8 .3
14 ' I.f 11 3 ).8 0.8 0.3
15 Inf 7 5 0.8 0.8 0.3
16 f 11 5 0.8 0.8 0.3
17 f 7 3 ).(6 ().(6 0).7
18 11f 11 3 0.6 0.( 0.7
19 1 .f 7 5 0.6 0.6 0.7
2(0 n f 11 5 0.6 0.(6 0.7
21 f 7 3 .8 O. ( 0.7
2'2 lf 11 3 0.8 ().(j6 0.7
23 If_ 7 5 0.8 0.6 0.7
2 4 -f 11 5 0.8 0.6 0.7
25 1 f 7 3 0.6 (.8 0.7
26 Of 11 '3 0.6 0.8 0.7
27 i1f 7 5 0.6 0. 8 0.7
28 'Hf 11 5 0.6 .X8 0.7
29 ,'f 7 3 0.8 0.8 0.7
30 2f 11 3 0.8 0.8 0.7
31 Hl~f 7 5 0.8 ().8 0.7
32 l1,f 11 5 0.8 0.8 0.7
33 11, 5 4 0.7 0.7 0.5
34 11, 13 4 0.7 0.7 0.5
3.5 'a 9 2 0.7 0.7 0.5
36 ,, 9 6 0.7 0.7 0.5
3 7 9 4 0.4 0.7 ().5
38 '11 9 4 0.94 0.7 0.5
39 'Ha 9 4 0.7 0.46 (0.5
40) a 9 4 0.7 0.94 0.5
41 11a 9 4 0.7 0.7 0.02
42 11n 9 4 0.7 0.7 0.98
4:3 1 9 4 0.7 0.7 ().5
Table 4.5: Central CompIosite Design SMatrix
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were so unreliable that they gave tile wrong information most of the time. this entire
exercise as well as the actual system would be ineffectual.
Experiment 7: This experimentl varied the numlllber of initial interceptors in the scenario
between 3 and 16. Te experiment did not include runs with tile initial inventory
less than 3. because the most relevant runs involved nmore interceptors than targets.
With fewer or equal interceptors than targets. the best action is to assign all of the
interceptors in inventory.
Experiment 8: The number of initial targets in this experiment, was varied between 1
and 10. Again, as the numlber of targets approaches the numlber of interceptors, the
resulting policy solution is less interesting, as all of the inventory will be assigned.
Table 4.6 summarizes these three experiments.
Experiment Varied Factor Levels Response Variables
Policy Solution
5 Intermediate Weight, w () < u < 1 Targets Leaked
Remaining Inventory
Prob of No Leakage
0.5 < Pm,, < 1 Policy Solution
Targets Leaked6 Pn,) ad P, 0.5 Phh < _ Ph_6Pn =0 Pith 1 Remaining Inventory
Prob of No Leakage
Policy Solution
7 Interceptors, /0o 3 to 16 Targets Leaked
Remlaining Invenltory
Prob of No Leakage
Policy Solution
8 Targets, pto 10 Targets Leaked
Remaining Inventory
Prob of No Leakage
Table 4.6: Single-Factor Experiments
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4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter describes tile iplelelltation of the roblem formulation from Chapter 3. It
begils with a discussion of how the MIMIR algorithm is used to I)rovi(e a I)olicy solution for
tile first two cases alnd( how a POMIDP solver is used to I)rovide the pIolicy solution for Case
3. It discusses the various POMDP solution algorithms and how they are differentiated by
t lie nethod use.. to create a. value fiunction over the belief states. We then describe how the
I)erforlllance of the cases is estimated with a simulation of the single engagement using the
policy solution (c:eated froln the IIMMR algorithm or the POMDP solver. The chapter finishes
with a discussion of the experimental design beginning with initial experiments. continuing
ith a central comIlosite design, . anl ending with a series of single-factor experiments.
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Chapter 5
Results and Analysis
This chapter assesses the potential imlpact of imperfect information on the perfornimance of
interceptor a.ssignment. and the possibility of accounting for this uncertainty with a PO.MDP
aplI)roach. Illn order to do this we carry out a series of experiments that. compare the decisions
anld performance of the three cases described in Chapter 3: perfect. information. iinperfect.
information assumed perfect. and imperfect information known to be imperfect. This chapter
discusses the results of the experiments outlined in Chapter 4.
MVe begin witll the results from the baseline scenario. This serves as a basis for comparison
for all other results. We then compare the three POMDP solution algorithms in Experiment
1. Next. we examine the performance of the PONIDP solver with various terminal reward
functions in Experiment 2. With the last initial experiment. we assess the performance of
each case with varying SSPKs.
Experiment 4 provides us with the data. necessary to develop three statistical models.
W~e conduct. an analysis of variance (ANOVA) on each of these three quadratic models and
then check for mnodel adequacy. The response variables in each model are a. difference in
perfornlance between Cases 2 and 3 using three different measures of performance. Each
model includes five factors.
Our final four experiments assess the factors used in Experiment 4, by varying them
in(lividually. We assess the impact of w!l from the results of Experiment 5. In Experiment
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6, we vary P,,h, and P,,,, silmultaneously. and determine how they affect the performance of
Cases 2 and 3. Finally. in Experiments 7 and 8. we assess the impIact of the mlnIbler of initial
interceptors and initial targets respectively. WVe nd this chapter with overall conclusions
based on these experiments.
5.1 Initial Results
5.1.1 Baseline
As stated in Chapter 4. experimentation began with a baseline scenario. Chosen for its
realistic settings. this baseline is the starting point for all following experiments. The results
for the baseline scenario are shown in Table 5.1.
Response j Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Execution Time NA NA 35.40 sec
Instability NA NA 243,388
Alpha Vectors NA NA 67
Policy Solution 4:0,3,6.6 4:0,3.6,6 3:1,2,2,3
Prob of No Leak 0.9963 0.9494 0.9367
Remaining Inventory 4.6554 3.468 5.2829
Leaked Targets 0.0037 0.0524 0.0697
Weighted Combination 0.83707 0.76862 0.814177
Table 5.1: Results from Baseline Scenario
In this table, "Case 1' corresponds to perfect information, "Case 2" corresponds to
perfect information assumed perfect and "Case 3' corresponds to imperfect information that
is known to be imperfect. This terminology is used throughout the chapter. In Table 5.1,
the first three results only apply to the POMDP solver (Case 3). "Execution Time" shows
the time required for the POMDP solver to execute and solve the problem. This correlates
to the size and complexity of the problem, as well as the speed of the algorithm used to
solve it. "Instability"' is the number of linear programming subproblems that had numerical
instability during the execution of the PONIDP solver. "Alpha. Vectors" refers to the number
of alpha vectors in the solution provided by the POMDP solver, and is highly correlated with
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tile illstab)ilit. As tllhe instabilitv increases ill a I)roblem,. it is more difficult to find whllich
al)lla vectors dominate over the belief space. Consequently, the number of alpha vectors in
the solution inc(1eases. Muclh like instability. this also correlates to tile comllplexity and size
of tlle Iroblem.111 These three results only apIply to Case 3 and give a general baseline for the
pIerforlmancee of the POMIDP solver.
The next five results in Table 5.1 are used as a baseline for complarison between each of
the three cases. The "Policy Solution" is depicted in the form
((I: a.: a". a" (°-l1)
where a is the first action ad a. is the second action based onl an observation. Because this
problem begins with three targets. there are only four possible observations. "Probability of
no leak." P,,1. "Remaining Inventory." /]2. and 'Lea.ked Targets" are direct ways to compare
the performance of each case in this baseline scenario. Lastly. "';,eighted Combination."
1TU. is a. method to assess each case based oni the weight, wU in the reward function. This
value pIrovides all overall metric of performance combining P,,1 and 2. Il I is calculated by
Equatioll 5.1.
l' = 'Ill,p + (1 - Uwi) (5-1)
As call be seen in Table 5.1, Case 3 has a. more conservative policy solution than the two
other cases. and consequently has a greater rema.ining inventory. In spite of this conservatism.
Case 3 almost matches the probability of no leakage of Case 2: 93.67/i: compared to 94.49%.!.
Case 1 proves to have the highest probability of no leakage. allowing only 0.0037 targets
leak through defenses onl average. In comparison of '. Case 1 does the best. followed by
Case 3. and Case 2. It is importanlt to note that if the weight, uw. is truly the importance
of probability of no leakage compared to inventory remaining, then TI is probably the best
metric when comparing the three ca.ses.
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5.1.2 Experiment 1
Experiment 1 is simply a. comparison of three algorithms used to solve the POnIDP. The
results of this experinent are shown in Table 5.2. The first important result from this exper-
Algorithm Enumn Witness Incprune
Execution Time 30 mrin 24.91 sec 23.81 sec 35.40 sec
Inst ability 892.667 256.,785 243.388
Alp)ha Vectors 531 42 67
Policy Solution 3:1,2.2.3 3:1,2.2.3 3:1.2,2.3
Table 5.2: Results from Experiment 1
iment is that all three algorithmls p)roduce the same policy solution. So, aside from the fact
that some algorithms may take longer than others. all three could be used interchangeably
in further experiments. However, Table 5.2 clearly shows that the algorithm does matter
when it comes to execution time. The enumeration algorithm takes over 30 minutes to run
for this one scenario, while both the witness and incremental pruning algorithms require
only around 30 seconds to run. In addition, the enumeration algorithm has far more alpha
vectors and linear programming subproblems with instability than the other two algorithms.
In this experiment the witness and incremental pruning algorithms are very similar in execu-
tion time and instability. Ultimately the incremental pruning algorithm was chosen for the
remaining experiments not only because this experiment proved it to be fast and efficient,
but also due to previous research by Littman, Cassandra. and Zhang that showed it to be
the simplest and fastest algorithm to date [7].
5.1.3 Experiment 2
In the next experiment we examine various terminal reward functions, F(s) and their effect
on the POMDP solver. The results of this experiment are shown in Table 5.3 where the
terminal reward function. F(s), is described by (T1, U.T2). While the results of this exper-
iment are not completely conclusive, they do provide some useful insights. First., it is clear
that as WT2 increases by orders of magnitude, the execution time, instability, and number of
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Table 5.3: Results fronl Experiment 2
alI)ha vectors generally increase. 'We note that higher instability may not indicate an inferior
solution. ut. mnore likely a larger or more complex problem.
N\ost ilI)ortantly. this experiment shows that the policy solution highly depends on the
terminal rewardls. In this baseline scenario. no terminal rewards or even terminal rewards
with small weights on targets remaining, WT2. provide somewhat strange policy solutions.
in which the first action is very small. When the first action is less than the inumlber of
targets. it is iml)ossible to have an observation of zero or more targets depending on the
dlifferelince between action and targets. This is depicted in Table 5.3 where a second action
is listed as 'NA." This indicates that an action is not applicable to that situation, because
a, < po. However. even with these strange cases, as 'T2 increases. the policy solution uses
more interceptors. This result is logical. a.s increasing W'T2 places more value on stopping
targets comparedl to conserving interceptors.
Overall. this experiment shows that a. logical and balanced policy solution results from
VY!T2 - 100. With this setting. all actions were at least a.s great a.s the number of targets
thought to be remaining. and more interceptors were used as mrnore targets were observed.
Subsequent experiments were conducted with the settings W!T = 1 and wuT2 = 100. Ill
a sense this says that a.t the end of the engagement, we are 100 times more concerned
about stopping targets from leaking through defenses than saving ourl inventory. To change
the policy solution slightly based on the preferences of an actual decision maker. we could
increase or decrease WT2 from a value of 100.
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17 F(s) |j None [ (0.0) I (1.1) (1.1() I (1.100) (1,1000) (1.1(0000) 
Execution Tile 0.24 sec 0.49 sec 1.76 sec 5.28 sec 35.39 sec 55.15 sec 49.72 sec
Ilstability 531 5:31 10.748 50.940 243388 335.882 305.388
Alpha Vectors 24 24 46 44 67 74 45
Policy Solution 1:NA.NA.1.6 1:NA.NA.1.7 2:NA.2.1.1 3:1.2.1.2 3:1.2.2.3 6:1.2.2.2 6:2.2.2.2
5.1.4 Experiment 3
Experiment 3 examines the effects of various single-shot probabilities of kill (SSPK) on the
performance of each of the three cases. Table 5.4 shows the policy solutions for each of
these cases. This table only lists values of 0.5 < SSPK < 0.98. because those are the most
SSPK Cases 1 and 2 [ Case 3
0.5 4:0,6.6.6 6:2.2.2.2
0.6 4:0.6.6,6 6:1.2.2,2
0.7 4:0,4.6.6 6:1.2,2.2
0.8 4:0,3.6.6 3:1.2.2.3
0.9 3:0.3.6.7 3:1.1.1.2
0.98 3:0.2.4.6 2:NA.1,1.1
Table 5.4: Policy Solutions for Experiment 3
relevant values. As previously mentioned, it makes little sense to use interceptors that have
a higher probability of missing a target than hitting one. In addition. an interceptor with
SSPK = 1.0, although operationally outstanding, provides little interesting insight into our
work. In that scenario. imperfect kill assessment matters little when every target can be hit
with certainty on the first shot.
In Table 5.4, we first note that Case 1 and Case 2 always have the same policy solution, as
they both use the MMR algorithm to determine how many interc(eptors to assign to targets.
The difference in the two cases is that in Case 1, an observation is always true, and in Case
2 it may not be true. This difference is not indicated in the policy solutions.
Table 5.4 also shows that in all of the cases, as SSPK increases the policy solutions
become more conservative with interceptor inventory. This result occurs because as kill
probability of a single interceptor versus a single target increases, fewer interceptors should
be required. The policy solutions in Cases 1 and 2 gradually become more conservative as
SSPK increases, while the policy solutions in Case 3 have a major decrease in number of
interceptors assigned in action 1 from SSPK = 0.7 to SSPK = 0.8. This occurs because
the POMDP solver generally assigns enough interceptors in action 1 so that each target is
assigned the same number, while the MMINR algorithm generally does not. For Cases 1 and
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2. most policy solutions assign four interceptors to three targets in action 1. while Case 3
typically assigns either six or three inltercep)tors to three targets in action 1.
While this trend of becoming more conservative as SSPK inl(reases exists in all cases.
Case 3 begins m1uch more conservatively in the first shot than the other cases, using six
as opposed to four interceptors with SSPK = 0.5. Likewise. with this SSPK. Cases 1
and 2 use six interceptors when at least one target is observed. while Case 3 uses only two
interceI)tors regardless of the observation. Although it seenls illogical not to use as many
interceptors a.s targets observed in Case 3. the POMDP solver knows that Prrh > 0. andl
that missing all three targets is unlikely. Therefore. while not necessarily te safest course
of action. it does make sense to use only two interceI)tors even when three targets were
observed.
Another major difference between Cases 1 and 2 and Case 3 is the number of interceptors
tlhev assign with an observation of no targets remaining. While the MINIR algorithllm never
assigns any inte:rceptors with an observation of no targets remaining. the POI\IDP solver
always assigns at least one interceptor, as it accounts for imperfect kill assessment.
Finally. it is important to note that as SSPK approaches values very close to one. the
cases vary greatly. Cases 1 and 2 still assign one interceptor for each target in the first
shot. and two interceptors for each target in the second shot. Case 3. however. continues
to become more conservative. With SSPK = 0.98 the PONIDP solver initially uses only
two intercel)tors. and then uses only one more interceptor regardless of the observation. In
essence it always uses three interceptors for three targets. when SSP 1.
In addition to comparing the policy solutions of each case. it is impIortaint to examine the
performnance of each case. We begin by comparing the probabilities of no leakage for various
levels of SSPK in Figure 5-1. This chart includes more experimental runs than depicted in
Table 5.4. as we varied SSPK at increments of 0.02 between 0.7 < SSPK < 1.0. In this
('hart. the probability of no leakage generally increases as SSPK increases for all three cases.
Case 1 I)rovides an upper bound on the probability of no leakage for the other cases. For
tlhese other two cases. Case 2 outperfornms Case 3 with SSPK = 0.5 and SSPK = 0.6. After
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Figure 5-1: P,,r versus SSPK
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that region. Case 3 generally matches the P,,, of Case 2. The P,,l in Case 2 increases lluch
more gradually than that of Case 3, which can be attributed to the imore gradual changes ill
policyv solutions shown in Table 5.4. The chart shows that for Case 3. large decreases ill the
mlnllber of interceptors assigned in action 1 correspIond to a decrease in P,I.
In addition to comparing pIerformance on probal)ility of no leakage. we examine the
inventorv remai:ring for each of the three cases. Figure 5-2 depicts a chart of this mnetric
as SSPK is varied. This chart shows that for all cases. as SSPK increases. the average
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Figure 5-2: /32 versus SSPK
inventory remaining also increases. This flows logically. as fewer interceptors should be
used if each interceptor is more lethal. Except for SSPK values around 0.7. the remaining
inventory for Case 3 generally matches that of Case 1. with Case 2 typically the lowest of
the three. Again. this makes sense, as the POIMDP approach is the most conservative with
inventory of the three cases. As with Figure 5-1. the inventory remaining for Case 3 increases
less gradually due to its more drastic changes in policy solutions.
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Lastly, we examine the effect of SSPK on 1. Figure 5-3 depicts a chart comparing each
case. In a. sense, this chart is a way to assess overall perfornmance by combining the trends
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Figure 5-3: WI versus SSPK
of the two previous charts using the weight., w1 . Figure 5-3 shows that as SSPK increases.
W1 also increases, as it is a linear combination of Phi and inventory remaining, which were
both shown to increase as well. Case 1 again proves to be an upper bound on the other
two cases. In addition, Case 3 almost always outperforms Case 2. This indicates all other
factors constant, as SSPK is varied, accounting for imperfect kill assessment proves better
than not accounting for it.
5.2 Central Composite Design Results
With a general idea of how the three cases perform from Experiments 1 through 3, we now
conduct a full statistical analysis to better understand how Cases 2 and 3 compare. Our
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focus in Experinlent 4 is oll the cases that have imperfect informnation. In order to estimate
an applropriate statistical model we use the central colImosite design described ill Chapter
4. wlhilch varies tile factors /30. po. P1h, P,n, and u1l silmultaneously. In this section. we will
refer to the effects of factors ;3o. Po( Phh. Pnm, and 1'i as A, B. C. D. and E respI)etively.
5.2.1 Model 1
Because we wish to compare the performance of Cases 2 and 3. we investigate three statistical
models with different response variables: AP,, A132 and Al. These variables represent the
difference in Case 2 and Case 3 probability of no leakage. remaining inventory, and I1
resp)ectively. ad. are calculated by the following equations:
A,, : P;3, P (5.2)
A1 2 = 3 - _32 (5.3)
Al = ' t -3-2 (5.4)
where the superscript indicates Case 2 or Case 3.
We begin with a quadratic model on Ap, that initially includes all five main effects,
all two-way interactions, and all square terms. We pare down this nlodel in a stepwu-ise
process to thile significant factors at thile a = 0.10 significance level to produce the analysis of
variance (ANOVA) results in Table 5.5. This table shows that the model is significant with a
p < 0.0001. In addition. all main effects are significant. One quadratic effect. B2. and three
two-way interaction effects, AB. BD, CD, are also significant. The lack of fit significance
indicates that this model may not fit., and that significant terms are omitted. However, this
nodel has significant lack of fit regardless of the terms included. The model also has an
R2 = 0.8415 and R 2adj = 0.8230. This indicates that approximat. ely 84% of the variability in
the data is explained by this model [13]. Rdj is an adjusted R 2 for the number of factors
in(luded in the model. R is useful, because in general. increasing the number of terms in
a model alone increases R2.
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Source Sum of Squares DF Mean Square F Value P-Value
Model 0.43 9 0.047 45.42 < 0.0001
A 0.029 1 0.029 27.62 < 0.0001
B 0.12 1 0.12 119.07 < 0.0001
C 0.020 1 0.020 18.81 < 0.0001
D 0.047 1 0.047 44.51 < 0.0001
E 4.577E-003 1 4.557E-003 4.38 0.0397
B 2 0.082 1 0.082 78.61 < 0.0001
AB 0.11 1 (.11 105.10 < 0.0001
BD 3.844E-003 1 3.844E-003 3.68 0.0589
CD 7.353E-003 1 7.35E-003 7.03 0.0097
Residual 0.081 77 1.046E-003
Lack of Fit 0.073 33 2.217E-003 13.24 < 0.0001
Pure Error 7.365E-003 44 1.674E-004
Cor Total 0.51 86
Table 5.5: Analysis of Varia.nce on Ap,,
Equation 5.5 shows the final quadratic model.
Ap,, = -0.023 + 0.019A - 0.039B + 0.015C - 0.023D + 7.252 x 10-3E
- 0.039B2 + 0.041AB + 7.750 x 10-3BD- 0.11CD
(5.5)
This equation indicates that although significant, E and BD have very little effect on the
response. In other words. the weight, wl and the interaction between targets. po, and Po,,,
do not greatly affect the difference in P,, between Case 2 and 3. It is important to note that
the effect of Po on this difference is quadratic. In addition, factors 130 and po and factors Pi,h
and Pm,,, both have strong interaction effects on this difference.
In order to test the adequacy of our model, we must make sure some assumptions hold
true. If is the error between predicted values and actual values, we assume that is
normally and independently distributed with a mean zero and constant variance [13]. We
first examine the normality assumption with Figure 5-4. For the normality assumption to
hold. the data points should fall along the line drawn through the chart. In this chart, we
see that some points a.t the top right, of the chart lie off of that, line. This indicates slight
departures from normality, but. overall the majority of points lie close to the line. Therefore,
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overall the normality assumption is valid.
Next. we examine the residuals for inldepIendence between runs. We already discussed
that there should be no relationship between runs. as our sinlulation and POMIDP solver
have no nlemory. Therefore. we did not randomlize our exp)eriments. Regardless of this fact.
we examine the independence of runs in Figure 5-5. This chart shows that there is no reason
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Figure 5-5: Residuals versus Runs in Model 1
to suspect any violation of the independence or constant variance assumption.
Lastly, we examine a plot of the residuals versus the predicted values from our model
shown in Figure 5-6. If our assumptions hold true, the residuals should not be related to
the predicted response variablle. In this chart. no unusual structure or pattern is apparent.
Overall, we have shown that our assumptions hold true and that our model is valid.
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Figure 5-6: Residuals versus Predicted Values in Model 1
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5.2.2 Model 2
Our second model fits a regression equation oil the response variable, Aif 2. As with the first.
nodel. we begin with an all-inclusive quadratic nlodel, and reduce the model in a stepwise
manner to only significant. termns. Table 5.6 shows the ANOVA results for this model. TWe
Source Sum of Squares DF [Mean Square F Value P-Value
Model 95.90 10 9.59 109.98 < 0.0001
A 59.73 1 59.73 685.00 < 0.0001
B 7.67 1 7.67 87.97 < 0.0001
C 12.58 1 12.58 144.25 < 0.0001
D 4.21 1 4.21 48.26 < 0.0001
E 0.80 1 0.8( 9.14 0.0034
A 2 2.27 1 2.27 26.03 < 0.0001
B 2 2.39 1 2.39 27.36 < 0.0001
AB 4.10 1 4.10 47.01 < 0.0001
AC 2.40 1 2.40 27.49 < 0.0001
BC 0.46 1 0.46 5.29 0.0242
Residual 6.63 76 0.087
Lack of Fit 6.46 32 0.20 52.94 < 0.0001
Pure Error 0.17 44 3.813E-003
Cor Total 102.52 86
Table 5.6: Analysis of Variance on Ai
see that with a p < 0.0001. NModel 2 is significant. In addition to all main effects. two
quadratic effects, A2 and B2 . are significant. This indicates that the relationship between
both interceptor inventory and number of targets to the difference in remaining inventory
is non-linear. The mlodel also includes three two-way interactions: AB, AC, and BC. This
suggests that the interceptor inventory, number of targets. and Phh have interacting effects
on the remaining inventory. As with MiNodel 1, this model has a significant lack of fit for
likely the same reasons. However, with R2 = 0.9354 and R = 0.9269, we know that about
93% of the variation in the response is explained by the model.
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Our final quadratic model is shocwn in Equation 5.6.
'32 = 1.28 + 0.86A - 0.31B - 0.38C + 0.22D - 0.096E
+ 0.21A2 + 0.21B - 0.25AB - 0.19AC + 0.085BC
(5.6)
We again check the assumptions of our model through three seI)arate charts. Figure 5-7
shows the normall probabilitv plot for Model 2. This chart. shows slight departures fiom
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F:igure 5-7: Normal Probability Plot of Residuals for Model 2
normality. especially at the ends of the data points. with most points in the center fa.lling
along the line. According to Montgomery slight deviations from normality such a.s these do
not significantly impact the validity of the ANOVA results [13]. Therefore, we may I)roceed
with our analvsis of the model.
We next examine the independence between runs shown in Figure 5-8. This chart depicts
no pIattern between the runs and so there is no reason to suspect any violation of the
independence or constant variance assumption.
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Figure 5-8: Residuals versus Runs in Model 2
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Finally. Figure 5-9 shows a chart of the residuals versus the p)redictedl values from our
lodel. The model is valid if the error is not related to the predict.e(l response variable. This
3 0o
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Figure 5-9: Residuals versus Predicted Values in Model 2
chart suggests no pattern or structure in the error. Our model proves to be valid as it does
.ot violate any of the assurmptions.
5.2.3 Model 3
In our third model. we fit a quadratic equation to the response variable AIV that includes
terms based on their significance, determined in a stepwise manner. The results from the
ANOVA are shown in Table 5.7.
Based on a p < 0.0001, M\Iodel 3 is significant. Although factor D is not statistically
significant, it is included in the model. Despite a. lack of statistical significance, we include
P: ,,,,, because of its operational importance as a factor in a single engagement. In addition
to main effects, this model has many other terms that are significant. Two square terms
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Source Sum of Squares [DF Mean Square F Value P-Value
Model 0.45 13 0.035 100.79 < 0.0001
A 0.11 1 (.11 333.38 < 0.0001
B 0.10 1 0.10 304.24 < 0.0001
C 0.015 1 0.015 44.42 < 0.0001
D 3.920E-004 1 3.920E-004 1.14 0.2894
E 0.18 1 0.18 529.31 < 0.0001
B 2 3.614E-003 1 3.614E-003 10.50 0.0018
*E2 2.464E-003 1 2.464E-003 7.16 0.0092
AB 7.042E-003 1 7.042E-003 20.46 < 0.0001
AC 2.025E-003 1 2.025E-003 5.88 0.0178
AE 2.275E-003 1 2.275E-003 6.61 0.0122
BC 5.131E-003 1 5.131E-003 14.91 0.0002
CE 7.704E-003 1 7.704E-003 22.38 < 0.0001
Residual 0.025 73 3.442E-004
Lack of Fit 0.023 29 7.811E-003 13.90 < 0.0001
Pure Error 2.473E-003 44 5.621E-005
Cor Total 0.48 86
Table 5.7: Analysis of Variance on Awll
are significant: B2 and E2 . Therefore. we know that the number of targets and the weight
have a quadratic effect on the difference in our weighted perforniance metric, WI1. Model
3 also includes six two-way interactions: AB. AC, AE, BC, and CE. It should be noted
that these six effects are the three included in Model 2: AB, AC, BC. in addition to all of
the statistically significant main effects interacting with factor E from Model 3. It is logical
that factor E is significant in addition to its interactions as wl has a direct impact on the
calculation of Aw. Therefore. we know that wl has a large impact on the overall performance
of Case 3. Model 3 also has significant lack of fit regardless of the terms included. but its
R2 = 0.9472 and Ra2 = 0.9378.
Our final quadratic model is shown in Equation 5.7.
,2 = 0.064 + 0.038A - 0.036B - 0.013C + 2.122 x 10 3D - 0.046E
- 8.329 x 10-3 B 2 + 4.847 x 10-3E2 + 0.010AB - 5.624 x 10-3AC
- 5.962 x 10-3AE + 8.954 x 10-3BC + 0.011CE - 5.356 x 10-3DE
(5.7)
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XWe' check thlle validity of our model l)v verifying tile assulmptions ab)out the error terml.
e. First. we check the nornlalitv of the residuals with the chart in Figure 5-10. The points
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Figure 5-10: Normal Probability Plot of Residuals for MIodel 3
i:tl this chart all lie verv close to the normalitv line, so we call assume the error is normally
distributted.
To deternline if the runs are independent, we use the chart in Figure 5-11. The residuals
in this chart appear completely random. which indicates independence and constant variance.
Third, we eamine Figure 5-12 to check if the residuals are related to the predicted
resI)onse. There is no pattern to suggest that the residuals are not independent of the
response. Based on these three charts, we have checked all of the assumptions of Model 3.
From our three sta.tistica.l models, we have seen that each of the five factors does not
have a simple linrea.r effect on the pIerformance of Cases 2 and 3. In all three models. there
were significant quadratic and two-way interaction terms. This imIplies that the response
variables are many times determined by a complex interaction of factors. Knowing this
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result. we proceed to our single-factor experiments.
5.3 Single-Factor Results
After gaining insight as to how five factors affect the performance of Cases 2 and 3. we. further
investigate the effects of these factors in single-factor exl)erilnents. Experiments 5 through
8 give us a more in-depth idea as to how sensitive the response variables are to changes
in each factor. We note that ba.sed on the results of Experiment 4, we cannot expect that
the results of these single-factor experiments to be completely typical of all scenarios. Due
to interactions between factors, beginning these experiments with different baselines could
prove to yield sonliewhat different results. Despite this fact. we still gain valuable insight.
from these one-factor experiments.
5.3.1 Experiment 5
Ve begin by varying the intermediate weight, ?'i,,
we examine the performance of each case as w is
Table 5.8 shows the policy solutions for each case at
in Experiment 5. In this experiment,
varied at. levels between zero and one.
various levels of uw. In this table, Cases
w Cases 1 and 2 Case 3
0.0 4:0.3.6.6 3:0.1,2,3
0.1 4:0.3,6,6 3:0.1.2.3
0.2 4:0.3,6.6 3:1.1,2.3
0.3 4:0,3.6.6 3:1.1,2.3
0.4 4:0,3,6.6 3:0.1,2.3
0.5 4:0.3,6,6 3:1,1.2,3
0.6 4:0.3.6.6 3:1.1,2,3
0.7 4:0,3.6,6 3:1,2,2.3
0.8 4:0.3.6.6 3:1,2.2,3
0.9 4:0.3.6.6 3:2,2.2.3
1.0 4:0,3,6.6 3:2.2.2,3
Table 5.8: Policy Solutions for Experiment 5
1 and 2 always have the same policy solution regardless of wI. This occurs because the MMR
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algorithnl used in these cases does not take v'l into account when making decisions. The
MNSIR algorithnl relies only on i. p. and SSPK to make decisions. Ill contrast. the POiIDP
solver used in Case 3 relies on the reward function calculated by tll to determine a policy
solution.
Table 5.8 also shows that in general as w. increases. the policy solution uses llore inter-
eI)tors in the second action. The first action consistently rellains at al = 3 regardless of
the l,/. This decrease in (onservatism occurs due to the nature of the reward fnction in
Equation 3.6. Higher levels of wI correspond to a R(s, o. a. s') that values P,,v. and likewise
lower levels of urf correspond to a R(s. o. a. s') that. values W. e should note that while the
policy solutions for Case 3 generally add more interceptors to action 2 as /w1 increases. this
trend does not occur for w'1I = 0.4. In this scenario the POIDP solver chooses to use one
less intercep)tor for a than the policy solutions for 'll = 0.3 and :/iw = 0.5. This aberration
nlay result from some instability in the POMIDP solver solution.
We. further investigate the impact of w/?l on the performlance of each case by examining the
problabilities of no leakage as ?/i changes. A chart of 1.'l versus P,1 is shown in Figure 5-13.
Ill this chart. Cases 1 and 2 a.re denoted by a single line. This occurs because the MIIR
algorithnl in both of these cases has the sanme policy solution regardless of 'u!i. Figure 5-
13 shows tha.t for Case 3 as U!1 increases, Pni generally increases as well. P,, begins at
app)roximatelv 84%c, and continually increases until it approaches the P,,i for Cases 1 andl 2
at appIroximlately 95%. Once w1r > 0.7, we see that P,, remains greater than 93/c. almost if
n.ot equaling the performance of Cases 1 and 2. We also notice the effect of the aberation in
policy solution a.t. .1 = 0.4 on P, 1,. as it decreases momentarily against the general trend.
Next, we consider a plot of the inventory remaining against varying levels of ?'t, shown
in Figure 5-14. This plot shows that Cases 1 and 2 have an average remaining inventory
of approximately 3.5 interceptors. The policy solutions of Case 3 gradually become less
conservative as uw' increases and leave less interceptors in inventory. For this case. a u1 ~ 0
corresI)onds to ¢1i2 ; 6. and a ui 1 corresponds to /32 m 5. Again. we notice the sa-me
al)erration at 'I = 0.4 as the only point on the line where the slope is positive.
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Lastly. we examine the effect of u.!l on 11'. A chart of this data is shown in Figure 5-15.
Based on the T4 measure of performance. Case 3 always outperforms the other cases. except
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Figure 5-15: W versus uIy
for wl = 1.0 where Aw 0. which could be explained by random error in the simulation.
The Wt' of Case 3 gradually increases as wl increases, but it does not increase as much as
17 for Cases 1 and 2. This difference in 14' is greatest when ul = 0 and decreases gradually
until there is no significant difference at w1! = 1.0. Based on 14, as we increase w, the
advantage of Case 3 over Cases 1 and 2 decreases.
5.3.2 Experiment 6
In Experiment 6 we vary Phh and P,,,,, simultaneously to examine the effect on the perfor-
mance of Cases 2 and 3. It should be noted that in Ca-se 1 Phr, = P,,.m = 1, so there is only
one data point for comparison. Table 5.9 shows a table of policy solutions for Cases 2 and
3 as P,,, and Pnr,, are varied between values of 0.5 and 1.0. In this experiment the policy
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Plh = Prn| Case 2 Case 3
0.5 4:0.3.6.6 3:2.2.2.2
0.6 4:0.3.6.6 3:1.2.2.2
0.7 4:0.3.6.6 3:1.2.2.3
0.8 4:0.3.6.6 3:1.2.2.3
0.9 4:0.3.6.6 3:1.2.3.3
1.() 4:0.3.6,6 3:0.2.3.3
Table 5.9: Policy Solutions for Experiment 6
solution for Case 2 is always constant. as it does not account for varying Ph,, or P,,,,m. Ill
other words Case 2 always assumes that P,,, = P,,- = 1. and conse(luently takes the same
actions. In colltrast. Case 3 does account for this imperfect kill assessment.
The values of Ph,, and P,,, affect the policy solutions in two different and indel)endent
ways. P,, affects the number of iterceptors used with none or few targets observed. P,,,,,
affects the nunber of interceptors used when a higher number of targets are observed. With
lower values of PEl1,. the POIDP solver uses fewer interceI)tors in action 2 with observations
of mlany targets remaining. In a sense, it does not trust these observations and does not use
as many interceptors as seems appropriate. This occurs due to low P,,, which implies a larger
t:,,lh. This means that we think we missed more targets than we actually missed. Therefore.
when many targets are oblserved remaining, there is a good chance some of those have been
hit. Table 5.9 shows that when P,,, = P,,,n = 0.5 and three targets are observed, the
PO()IDP solver only uses two interceptors. Given this PI,,, and SSPK = 0.8. it is unlikely
that all targets were mnissed even if they were all observed missed. As P,, improves. the
POMIDP solver gradually uses more interceptors with observations of two or three targets.
Inl a sense, it can trust the observations more.
While P,1h affected the policy solution with larger observations, Pm,,, affects the policy
solution when fewer targets are observed. With lower values of P,,,,, the POIDP solver
uses more interceptors in action 2 when observing zero targets remaining. This occurs due to
a low P,,,,.l which implies a higher Ph,
, . This means that we think we hit more targets thanl
we actually did. When zero targets are observed remaining. there is a good chance sonicme still
remain. In the scenario PEI, = P,,, = 0.5, the POMDP solver in Case 3 uses two interceptors
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when it. ol)serves zero targets remaining. As P,,,, imnproves. the POMDP solver can trust its
observations more and gra(lually uses fewer interceptors with observations of zero targets.
Finally. when P,,,, = 1. the POMIDP solver uses zero interceptors for an observation of zero.
In summary, the two effects of P,,, alld P,,,, produce the following result: a.s P,, and P,,,,,
increase, a decreases and a(1 and a increase.
In addition to the two independent effects of P,, and Prn,,. we observe that as Phh and
P,,,, both increase. action 2 goes from being comI)letely independent, of the observation to
being very dependent on the observation. The PONIDP solver cannot trust the observations
when PI,,, = P,,, = 0.5. so it always assigns two intercel)tors. However. when Ph,,, = P,,,, =
1.0, the POMIDP solver assigns very differently depending on the observation.
While the policy solutions provide an idea of how the decisions are made. we also need
to examine how Ph and P,,rn actually affect the performance of Cases 2 and 3. Figure 5-16
shows a plot of probl)alility of no leakage versus Ph,,, and P,,7,,,. This chart shows that most
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of the time Case 2 outperforms Case 3 in terms of P,, . Case 1 provides olle point. which is
all upper lbounmd. that is only matched by Case 2 when P,, = P,,,, = 1. This makes sense.
b)ecause when ,h1 = P,,,,r = 1. Case 1 and Case 2 are essentially the same. WVhile Case 2
always outperfoirms Case 3 except when Ph,, = P,,,,, = 0.7. it is important to note that Case
3 always almost matches the P,M of Case 2. There is never a difference in P,,t greater than
3c%/. and Case 3 values for P,,t never fall below 93/(%.
\e also exanmine a plot of Phi, and P,,,,, versus inventory remaining in Figure 5-17. This
_- ----- --
J
* Casel 
-- Case 2
-...... Case 3
0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Phh = Pinin
Figure 5-17: j3 versus Ph~h and P,,,
figure shows that Ca-se 3 always has a higher average inventory renlaining than Cases or
2. The diffrene been the remaining invenltories of these cases does decrease as Phh and
P,,, increase. but it never falls below one interceptor. Wlhen P : = P,,, = 0.5, A, > .
This is an important result, because the policy solutions of Ca-se 3 provide P,,, that almost
match those of Case 2 while saving between one and three extra interceptors.
Lastly. we analyze a plot of TV versus Phh ad P,,,, shown in Figure 5-18. This chart
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p)roves to be very similar to Figure 5-17. Ca-se 3 always has a higher H' than Cases 1 and 2.
anlld the differene between tel. AL,W. decreases as P,, and P,,n, ecrease.
(O)verall. Experiment 6 showed that over various levels for P,,, anlld PM,, Case 3 almost
natc(hes P,,1 for Case 2 and always outpIerfornls Cases 1 and 2 with respect to inventory
relailling and I1'.
5.3.3 Experiment 7
Experiment 7 varies the number of initial interceptors in order to compare the perfornlance
of all three cases. Table 5.10 shows the policy solutions for the three cases in this experiment.
Again. ill this experinlent. Cases 1 and 2 have the same policy solution based on the MMNIR
Interceptors Cases 1 and 2 Case 3
4 3:0.1.1.1 2:NA.1.1.1
5 3:0.2.2.2 3:1.1.1.1
6 3:0,3.3.3 3:1.1.1.1
7 3:0.3,4.4 3:1,1.2.2
8 3:0.3.5,5 3:1.2.2.3
9 3:0,3.6,6 3:1.2.2.3
10 4:0.3.6.6 3:1.2.2.3
11 5:0.3.6,6 3:1.2.2.3
12 6:0.3.6.6 3:1.2.2.3
13 6:0.3.7,7 3:1,2,2,3
14 6:0,3.8,8 3:1.2.2.3
15 6:0.3,8.9 3:1,2,2.3
16 6:0,3.8,10 3:1.2.2,3
Table 5.10: Policy Solutions for Experiment 7
algorithmn. The policy solutions for all cases gradually use inore interceptors as the inventory
increases. However, there are many differences between the policy solutions. The first. major
difference between Cases 1 and 2 and Case 3 is that the POMIDP solver in Case 3 always
assigns one interceptor for action 2 when the observation is zero targets. In contrast, the
MIIR algorithm never assigns an interceptor when no targets are observed. Another differ-
ence between the cases is how each case uses its inventory. In Cases 1 and 2 the algorithm
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takes advantage of its inventory assigning mnole interceptors as its inventory increases. The
POMDP solver for Case 3 is far more conservative. Regardless of its inventory, it never
assigns more than six interceI)t.ors in a. single engagement. When 30 > 8 the policy solution
is always (3:1,2.2.3). In addition. for a small initial inventory of interceptors. Case 3 does
not always use all of its inventory, while Cases 1 and 2 always use their filll inventory. In
fact with four initial intercei)tors. Case 3 only uses three interceptors, assigning al = 2 and
a2 = 1 regardless of the observation.
While the policy solutions provide some insight as to the sensitivity of each case to
changes in initial inventory, we also examine the sensitivity of the probability of no leakage,
remaining inventory, and T . Figure 5-19 depicts a chart of P,, versus interceptors. This
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Figure 5-19: P,,, versus/30
table shows that Case 1 is an upper bound on P,,I that. is almost reached by Case 2 for high
values of /o. In general, Case 2 also does better than Case 3. Except for o30 = 4 and 30 = 5.
the difference between Cases 2 and 3 is not too considerable. When /30 > 8, the difference
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in P,, is inever greater than 6%.
Next we consider a plot of interceptors versus inventory remaining in Figure 5-20. This
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chart shows that Case 3 almost always has more remaining inventory than Cases 1 arid 2.
and Case 1 performs better than Case 2. This occurs because Case 3 typically has a much
nlore conservative policy solution. Although they have the same policy solutions. Case 1 has
nmore remaining inventory than Case 2 because it sees observations of three and two targets
nluch more rarely, as in Case 1., Phh = 1.
We further explore the relationship of initial inventory to each case's performance with a
plot of interceptors versus V in Figure 5-21. In this figure, we observe that as in Figure 5-19.
Ca.se 1 serves as an upIper bound on I for the other two cases. The difference from that
plot is that Case 3 has a higher W than Case 2 after > 7. Even when 4 < ;30 < 7, the
difference in 1' t: between Cases 2 and 3 never exceeds 0.05.
Overall. this experiment showed that the performance of Case 3 is somewhat sensitive to
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chlallges in initial inventory. pIarticularly with respect to P,,I. TWhile Case 3 outIperforms the
other cases in terms of inventory remainlling, it does not have P,,1 levels as high as Cases 1
or 2 for lower initial inventories of interceIptors. Inl add(litioll. ITf for Case 3 does not match
tillat of Case 2 for lower numbers of interceptors.
5.3.4 Experiment 8
In our final experiment. we vary the number of initial targets. p(, between one and ten.
leaving all other factors at the baseline level. Te policy solutions for this experiment are
shown in Table 5.11. The policy solutions in this table are not extremely different between
Targets Cases 1 and 2 Case 3
1 1:0.3 2:0.2
2 3:0.3.7 2:1.2.2
3 4:0,3.6.6 3:1.2.2.3
4 4:0.3.6.6.6 4:1.2.2.3.4
5 5:0.3.5.5.5,5 5:1.2.3.3.3.3
6 6:0,3,4.4.4.4,4 6:1.2.2.2.2.2.2
7 7:0.3.3.3.3.3,3.3 7:1.1.1.1.1.1.1.2
8 8:0.2,2.2.2,2.2.2.2 8:1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1
9 9:0.1.1.1.11,1.1,1.1 8:N A.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1
10 10:0.0.0.0.0,0.0.0.0.0.0 9:NA.1.1,1.0.0.0.0.0.0
Table 5.11: Policy Solutions for Experiment 8
Cases 1 and 2 and Case 3. Except when po = 1. the second action given an observation of
zero targets for Case 3 is always a = 1. In general, Case 3 is much more conservative in
terIlls of its second actions. Particularly when po > 5. the POMDP solver in Case 3 does
not always use a.s mlany interceptors in action 2 as targets observed. This occurs because
the reward function values remaining inventory, and it is still fairly unlikely to mIiss half of
the targets given the baseline SSPK.
The number of targets versus probability of no leakage is plotted in Figure 5-22. In this
figure, Case 1 always performs the best with respect to P,,t. and Case 2 performs better than
Case 3. Case 3. owever. almost matches the performance of Case 2 for po < 5.
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generally has the greatest remaining inventory, with Case 2 having the least remaining
inventory. Also.. similar to previous experiments. the difference between Cases 2 and 3
becomes greater as the number of targets increases.
Finally, we compare the three cases with the weighted combination of P,,, and /.2 in
F'igure 5-24. This chart appears much like that of Figure 5-22. in which Ca-se 1 performs the
best. However, with respect to I, Ca.se 3 does better for Po < 5 and Ca.se 2 does better for
p) > 5. This nhart g alo with the other two from this experiment show that Case 3 is very
sensitive to chlanges in the number of initial targets. Specifically, as p approaches /30, Case
3 becomes much less effective, and the INMMR algorithml of Case 1 and 2 proves superior with
respect. to P,,. 32, and IV.
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5.4 Chapter Summary
Tllis chal)ter contains the results and analysis for all eight experimenlits. It begins with a
discussion of the lbaseline case. chosen as a possible real-world sc'enario. This baseline is the
starting poillt for all other experiments. The first three experiments varield factors that would
later bIe held constant: algorithnl. terminal reward function. and SSPK. We found that
all algorithms provide the samne policy solution, lbut incremental pruning generally provides
the fastest and :inost stable algoritlln. In Experiment 2 we found that the PO\IDP solver
is verv sensitive to the terminal reward function, F(s). and we deterlined a setting for this
finction that produces reasonalble results. Experiment 3 showed that the l)erforlrlnace of
each ('case is very dependent on SSPK, however, Case 3 generally performs as well if not
better than the other cases regardless of SSPK.
After conducting the initial experiments, we exanlined the way five factors affect )both
Case 2 and Case 3. We ran Experiment 4 in a central composite design in order to test for
quadratic terms and factor interactions. Ve set up three quadratic Inodels on the differences
of P,,t. ,'32. and between Case 2 and Case 3. We found that all three models prove(d
significant. and that all three had significant quadratic termls and two-way interactions. This
tells us that there are complex relationships a.rnong the factors that affect the I)erforniance
difference between Cases 2 and 3.
Lastly, we ran four single-factor experiments to further analyze the effect on the perfor-
mallce for each of the five factors in Experiment 4: wl, Ph. P,n, o0, and po. The overall
comnclusions froim these four experiments were generally the samne. We found that Case 3
tyl)ically has lower Pl than the other two cases, but for most scenarios, this difference is
very small. MIany times Case 3 is within 3% to 6% of Case 2 in ternls of P,,1. At the same
timne. Case 3 typically conserves may more interceptors. This can be attributed to Ca-se 3
always assigning an interceptor with an observation of no targets. These two facts lead to a
Ca.se 3 W that is generally better than Ca.se 2 anld sometimes better than Case 1. Overall.
we found that using the PO.MDP solver in Case 3 provides policy solutions that achieve
a.lost equal P,,1 as in Case 2. but consistently have a greater iventory of interceptors re-
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mIaining. Using I' as an overall mletric. Case 3 generally does better thanl Case 2. These
experiments also showed that while Case 3 was somewhat sensitive to all factors. it proved
most sensitive to 3o and Po. The performance of this case was especially questionable as the
scenario approachedl /30 Po.
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Chapter 6
Summary and Future Work
This chapter serves as a sunlmmary of the thesis and sonle final conclusions. It also provides a
descriI)tion of possible future work expanding on this research or applying it to other areas.
6.1 Thesis Summary
The goal of this thesis is to address the issue of imperfect information received fron sensors
in a ballistic missile single engagement and to investigate a. method for making decisions
in light of this uncertainty. To our knowledge, this is the first work that addresses the
issue of imperfect kill assessment in the single engagement problem (consisting of a wave
of incoming targets and a set of interceptors). We deal with the imperfect information by
fornlulating the problem as a partially observable Mlarkov decision process (PONIDP). We
assess the performance of this formnulation by comparing it to two other cases in a series of
experiments.
In Chapter 1 we outlined the motivating problemn for this work: a Groulnd-based Mid-
course Defense (GMID) systenl. As this system grows and improves, uncertainty in sensor
reliability mnay be an issue. The single engagement problem is assumned to be a "shoot-
look-shoot" scenrio. After an initial shot of a set of interceptors at a set of targets, sensors
observe which targets were hit and which targets were missed before the second shot is taken.
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Imperfect information from these sensors could have serious affects on the decision of how
many interceptors to use in the second shot.
Chapter 2 focuses on the basis for our formulation. We discuss the use of dynamic
progranming to optimize an objective over multiple decisions. We describe the class of
problems known as Markov decision processes (IiDP), which are the basis for POMIDPs.
WVe outline the components of MDPs and the decision cycle. Next. we expand on this set of
problems to describe the POM\DP as an M\DP in which the state of the system is not known
with certainty. We explain the use of the belief state as a. sufficient, statistic for the state.
Chapter 2 concludes with a description of the weapoii-target assignment (WTA) problem.
While the WVTA approach does not account for the inperfect kill assessment addressed in
this thesis. it does provide some useful mathematical ideas about methods for interceptor
assignment.
In Chapter 3 we present three cases for comparison: perfect information from our
sensors (Case 1), imperfect information from sensors assumed perfect (Case 2). and imperfect
information from sensors that decisions account for (Case 3). We formulate the third case
as a. POMIDP.
Chapter 4 provides a description of the process used to solve and test the performance
of each of the three cases. We begin with a. description of the maximum marginal return
(MIMR) algorithm used to make interceptor assignments in Cases 1 and 2. From there we
discuss the POMDP solver and its solution algorithms used to make interceptor assignments
in Case 3. Next, we explain the solution process for a. single experimental run. In this process,
a simulation for the single engagement uses either the IMMR algorithm or the POMDP solver
to make interceptor assignments. This simulation over many trials estimates the performance
of each case. Chapter 4 continues with a. description of the experimental design. We begin
with experiments to assess the effect of factors to be held constant in later experiments.
Next, we conduct statistical analysis on three models to determine how five different factors
impact the performance for Cases 2 and 3. Lastly, we conduct single-factor experiments on
these five factors to gain a more detailed understanding of how they affect performance.
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In Chapter 5 we preselnt the results fromn the exI)erimlents described ill Chapter 4. For
the initial expIeriments we find that the incremental pruning algoritllhm for solving POMIDPs
is the fastest and most stable algorithm. We also find that the algorithml is very sensitive to
the terminal reward function. and we find a setting that provid(es reasonable results. Lastly.
we show that all three cases are very sensitive to single-shot probability of kill (SSPK). but
Case 3 generally performls better when varying this factor. In Experiment 4 we find that
all three statistical models are significant. We find that not only all five factors. but at
tinles their quadratic effects and interactions. highly impact the response variables. For the
single-factor experilnents we find that for most of the experinments. the POMIDP approach of
Case 3 conserves more interceptors and still ap)roachlles the probability of no leakage of Case
2. Based on the overall performance inetric. 11. we show that Case 3 tyl)ically outperforms
Case 2.
In conclusion. the purIpose of this thesis was to investigate the impact of imperfect kill
assessment. UWe showed that assuming perfect information in a world where it is imperfect
maly significantly decrease the performance of tile system, leading to a much lower probability
of no leakage and wasted inventory. Our POMIDP approach consistently conserved far more
interceptors and generally performed well in termns of probability of no leakage. At the very
least. this approach showed that using a. single interceptor when no targets are observed canl
improve the overall probability of no leakage significantly. This approach. however, was very
sensitive to the scenario. in particular the initial interceptors and initial targets. The policy
solutions produced by the POMDP solver were not always reasonable. It is unlikely that a
decision mnaker would use fewer interceptors than targets observed, unless that observation
were extremely unlikely. Overall. the PONMDP a.pproach plroved a valuable tool for making
decisions under uncertainty in the single engagement problem.
6.2 Future Work
The work in this thesis on imperfect kill assessment could easily be expanded and continued
to handle a. broader array of missile defense scenarios. \Ve suggest the following a.reas of
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further research in the missile defense field:
· Our work assumed uniform reachability bet~weeii targets and interceptors. In reality,
incomling missiles have varying degrees of reachability depen(ing on target destination
from where they are launched. and the location of the interceptors in relation to the
flight. path. In particular. there are currently two different interceptor locations.
* Our work also assumed identical single-shot probabilities of kill, SSPK, for each target.
Targets may actually have different SSPKs based oil each target-interceptor assign-
ment; that is, some targets may be more difficult to destroy than others.
* This work did not address the existence of decoy targets. In reality, it is possible that
some of the initial or observed targets are decoys and not actually warheads. This
discrimlination between decoys and actual targets adds a new element of uncertainty
to the problem that was not formulated in this thesis.
* We also assunled that each target had an equal value. It is very reasonable that
not every incoming target has the same value, especially if they are headed towards
different locations. Certain cities or military installations have greater strategic value
than others based on their population or on other factors. Thus. the value of any
individual incoming missile might vary depending on its destination.
* This work also assumed that the initial state of the system is completely observable;
that is, the initial wave of targets is known with certainty. It is quite possible that this
may not be true. Future work could formulate a POMDP with a. different, initial belief
state.
* Our work only considered one wave of incoming targets. Considering multiple waves
of targets and modeling the state uncertainty in multiple waves would be a logical
extension of this research.
In addition to expanding this research in the context of the missile defense problem,
the work in this thesis could easily apply to a variety of other problems. The POMDP
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fiorillation as well as the techniques used to solve the PO.MDP mlay be applied to other
lbattle lalnageIm.ent rob)lenls. Specifically. pIroblemls involving allocating limited resources
ill a lilliite(l time-framle under uncertainty with consequences for every action mnay closely
resemble the single engagement problem. These problems could be defense or lnonll-defense
relatedl.
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Appendix A
Glossary of Acronyms and Terms
action : decision made at each stage in a PORIDP
alpha vector : vector with a value for each state corresl)onding to an action
ANOVA : Ana:lsis of Variance
belief space: ,et of all possible belief states
belief state: probability distribution over all possible states
BMDS : Ballistic Missile Defense System
boost phase : first phase of missile flight in which it is powered by engines
case: set of assumptions and realities for the single engagement problem
CCD: Central Composite Design
DSP: Defense Support Program
EKV: Exoatniospheric Kill Vehicle
epoch : iunber of stages left in which actions can be taken
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experiment : test ill which changes are made to input variables of a process in order to
observe the reasons for changes in the output variables [13]
factor: input variable that affects the outconle of the exp)eriment
GMD : Ground-based Midcourse Defense
interceptor: defensive missile designed to destroy incoming offensive missiles
kill assessment : the conclusion by a sensor network of whether an incoming target was
destroyed
leakage : allowing a target to pass through defenses and strike its destination
MDP : Markov Decision Process
midcourse phase : second phase of missile flight in which it travels above the atmosphere
and releases warheads
MMR: M\aximum Marginal Return
observation : perceived state of the system
policy solution: provides the optimal action a.t each stage for each possible state
POMDP: Partiallv Observable Markov Decision Process
response: output variable from an experiment.
reward : conlsequence of an action
RV : Re-entry Vehicle
shot: one-tilme assignment of nmultiple interceptors to multiple targets
single engagement : shoot-look-shoot opportunity against one wave of incoming targets
SSPK : Single-shot Probability of Kill
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stage : partition of a dynamic progralllling probl-lenl ill which action Inmst l)e mna(le
state : condition of tile systeim
target : incomling offensive missile
terminal phase : third Illase of missile flight in which warhea(l falls back into atmllosphere
transition : system halnge from one state to another
U JAV : nllmanned aerial veihicle
IJSNORTHCOM: United States Northern Conmland
lJSSTRATCO:M: United States Strategic Commrnand
value function: piecewise linear combination of alpha. vectors over a belief space
WTA : Weaponl-Target Assignment
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Appendix B
Notation
B.1 POMDP Formulation
, E S state
, E A : action
o C (: ob)servatioll
7'(s. a, s') : transition model
O(s, o. a. , s') : observation model
R(s. o. a., s') : intermediate reward model
F'(.s) : terminal reward model
b E 7(s) : belief state
b( s) = p: probability of being in state s
V/'(b) POMDP value finction
6 : discount factor for finite horizon POMIDPs
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B.2 Problem Implementation
130 : number of initial interceptors
P0 : number of initial targets
: number of interceptors remaining in inventory
p: number of targets remaining
SSP : single-shot probability of kill
g : number of targets with most interceptors assigned to them
2 : number of targets with fewer interceptors assigned to them
n.: number of interceptors assigned to each of the g targets
PK1 : overall probability of no leakage for each of the gy targets
PK 2 : overall probability of no leakage for each of the 92 targets
PKsi,, : randomly generated number to compare to PK1 or PAk2 in simulation
h : number of hits from an assignment
Pmml : probability of observing a miss given a miss actually occurred
Ph.m : probability of observing a hit given a. miss actually occurred
Ph,, : probability of observing a hit given a hit. actually occurred
P7 h : probability of observing a miss given a hit. actually occurred
Pobs randomly generated nlumnber to compare to Ph,, or Pmrm in simulation
m.: number of observed misses
h : number of observed hits
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m1.n : nluhll)el of actual misses
h,, : nnlll)er of actual hits
lb : lower bound oil observations
u) upper boun d on observations
-ic, : intermediate reward( weight
"'u : terminal reward weight on inventory remaining
u'r, : terlninal reward weight on targets remaining
B: number of interceptors remaining in inventory during MIM\IR assignment pIlanning
I : total numbe:r of interceptors remaining in inventory for all simulation trials
L : total lnuilbe:r of sinmulation trials that allowed target to leak through defenses
t : ullrlber of simulation trials
B.3 Experimental Design
( : distance fromli center points for axial runs
7f : lmll)er of factorial runs
'n, : ilrl)er of axial runs
n, : nunmber of center points
B.4 Results
P,,l : probability of no leakage
/% : intercelptors remlaining in inventory after second shot
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11' : weighted combination of probability of no leakage and inventory remaining
Ap,, : difference in probabilities of no leakage between Case 2 and 3
nAO : difference in inventory remaining between Case 2 and 3
A1w : difference in 117 between Ca.se 2 and 3
e : residual or error between predicted and actual response
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